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ABSTRACT 
Prosecutors can force witnesses to testify and use perjury prosecutions to hold them to the provable truth.  More 
controversially, prosecutors also offer witnesses inducements for favorable testimony, including leniency, immunity, 
and even cash.  This ubiquitous behavior would be illegal as witness bribery, except for a longstanding tradition 
of sovereigns using this power, which legal doctrine now reflects.  A causal analysis shows that even if prosecutors 
use this power only in good faith, these inducements undermine the epistemic value of witness testimony.   
Due process requires, and legal doctrine assumes, that when such inducements are disclosed to the jury, they will 
discount the witness testimony accordingly.  However, juries’ success in doing so is an empirical question.  We 
conducted three randomized experiments with 1,000 human subjects in roles of witnesses and jurors deciding 
vignettes based on real cases.  We find that incentives have large effects on witnesses, allowing prosecutors to 
routinely procure favorable testimony regardless of its truth.  Yet, disclosure has no detectable effects on either 
witnesses or jurors.   
We discuss two potential reforms.  First, courts could borrow from the practice with expert witnesses and use the 
current rules of evidence to conduct Daubert-like pretrial screening of incentivized witnesses for reliability.  We 
frame the appropriate counterfactual question about whether the incentives would cause a witness to give the same 
testimony even if it were false.  Second, we present the novel suggestion that prosecutors could decide whether to 
offer benefits to a witness based on whether she will testify to material information, but without knowing whether 
the information is favorable to the Government.  These mechanisms may preserve the value of incentives to produce 
information, while minimizing false testimony. 
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Prosecutors exercise a remarkable power to give witnesses things of value 
in exchange for their favorable testimony.  These things of value—including 
broad immunity from prosecution, dropped charges, reduced sentences, or 
even cash—are given or withheld at the discretion of the prosecutor.  These 
things of value induce witnesses to testify and to testify in ways that support 
the Government’s theory of the case.1   
These inducements are extremely common.2  As one assistant U.S. attorney 
 
 1 See H. Lloyd King, Jr., Why Prosecutors Are Permitted to Offer Inducements: A Matter of Constitutional Author-
ity, 29 STETSON L. REV. 155, 156–57 (1999) (listing inducements regularly extended by prosecutors 
in favor of testimony favorable to the Government).  
 2 See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 
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explains, “It is a rare federal criminal trial that does not require the use of crim-
inal witnesses—those who have pleaded guilty to an offense and are testifying 
under a plea agreement, or those who are testifying under a grant of immun-
ity.”3  Prosecutors routinely layer on extra charges to give them leverage, which 
can then be dropped as part of a plea deal with a cooperating witness.4  Com-
pared to the sorts of incentives that operate in the business world—say a $1,000 
cash bonus to an employee—immunity or charge bargaining can be profoundly 
valuable to the witness, amounting to years of liberty and hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of wages, which would otherwise be lost to imprisonment. 
The Government sometimes puts cash on the table.  For example, the 
FBI paid over a million dollars to Emad Salem for his testimony in a terror-
ism trial for a plot to bomb the United Nations.5  Similarly, in exchange for 
cooperation, the government can decline to pursue asset forfeiture, restitu-
tion, fines, or other penalties that have cash value.6  The Government can 
also provide relatively minor benefits, which are nonetheless important to the 
witness while imprisoned, such as transfer to a different prison closer to fam-
ily, a parole recommendation letter, or even better food or cigarettes.7  In 
some notorious cases, witnesses have even received drugs and conjugal visits.8 
 
1 (2000) (stating that one in five federal defendants receive sentence reduction for assisting the Gov-
ernment). 
 3 Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informants and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L. REV. 679, 697 (1999). 
 4 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002) 
(“Plea bargaining is dishonest because the offense of conviction does not match either the charges 
the state filed or the reality of the offender’s behavior.  A particularly noxious form of dishonesty is 
overcharging by prosecutors—the filing of charges with the expectation that defendants will trade 
excess charges for a guilty plea.”). 
 5 James C. McKinley, Jr., Key Witness in Bomb-Plot Trial Admits Lying about His Exploits, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 8, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/08/nyregion/key-witness-in-bomb-plot-trial-
admits-lying-about-his-exploits.html (explaining that Emad Salem received one million dollars for 
testimony concerning his repetitive lies).  
 6 See Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys’ Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual 
Constitutional Rights, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (describing situations “in which a defendant’s guilty 
plea is exchanged for a government agreement not to seek forfeiture of assets used to pay attorneys’ 
fees.”); see also Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note, Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Com-
monsense Approach to Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1722 (2001) (explaining how prosecutors 
may involve assets as an incentive tactic). 
 7 Cf. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 27–28 (2009) (exploring incentives often offered to jailhouse informants); Rus-
sell D. Covey, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1375, 1379–80 (2014) (noting that jailhouse informants 
are often incentivized to testify by benefits such as cigarettes, cash, improved jail conditions, and 
even shortened sentences).   
 8 See Barry Tarlow, Can Prosecutors Buy Testimony?, CHAMPION, May 2005, at 55 (discussing Sharon 
Cohen, Sex, Lies, Drugs, Shame: Major Gang Prosecution Unravels in Chicago, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-15/news/mn-24063_1_federal-government); see also United 
States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1365–66 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (granting a new trial for defendants 
after prosecutors withheld positive drug tests of prosecutorial witnesses), aff’d 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 
1995); Brae Canlen, Prosecutorial Zeal, CALIF. LAW. (Mar. 1999), https://ww2.cal-
lawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt+NaN&eid=263747&evid=1 (describing a murder conspiracy case 
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Typically, these benefits are promised, but withheld until after the witness 
has actually testified in the way that the Government prefers.9  The prosecu-
tors implicitly, or sometimes very explicitly, condition such benefits on the 
witness offering favorable testimony.10   
A particularly effective promise is a prosecutor’s agreement to consider filing 
a motion asking a witness’s sentencing court to depart from federal sentenc-
ing guidelines on the basis that the witness has, in the prosecutor’s view, provided 
substantial assistance to the prosecution.  Without such a motion, the witness 
has no chance of obtaining [a] sentence below the guideline minimum.11   
As one commentator explains, “the controlling principle in any negotiation 
is that the prosecutor will only give something to get something.  Unless the 
proffering target has something to offer that will provide significant assistance 
in the prosecution of another target defendant, there will be no deal.”12  As 
a former prosecutor explains, he was able to “wield[ ] . . . a . . . cudgel to 
compel cooperation,” making “[t]he message to a defendant . . . clear: fail to 
cooperate at your peril.”13   
Although they have a long history, these practices are legally anomalous.  
For example, in a civil case where a party paid two witnesses $640,103, the 
district court found that, even if the payments were not made “corruptly,” 
they violated Rule 3.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which pro-
 
in which the San Diego DA’s office allowed their key witness to meet with his wife and other women 
at the DA’s office, where they had sex); Marty Graham, S.D. Grand Jury Rips County DA Office in 
Report: Handling of Informants Is Called Overzealous, L.A. DAILY J., June 11, 1998, at A1 (summarizing 
the embarrassing information about the San Diego DA’s dealings with the same key informant).   
 9 See e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (stating that witness was told that he 
“would definitely be prosecuted if he did not testify and that if he did testify” then the Government 
would exercise its “good judgment and conscience”—implicitly allowing it to evaluate the favora-
bility of the testimony).   
 10 See e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (providing explicitly that prosecutors may include in plea agree-
ments that the Government will “not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges,” a dispensation 
that would be a thing of value to a defendant).  Such agreements routinely require “substantial 
cooperation,” and that the Government can withhold the benefits if not satisfied with the witness’s 
performance.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1975 amendment (“It is ap-
parent, though not explicitly stated, that Rule 11(e) contemplates that the plea agreement may bind 
the defendant to do more than just plead guilty or nolo contendere.  For example, the plea agree-
ment may bind the defendant to cooperate with the prosecution in a different investigation.  The 
Committee intends by its approval of Rule 11(e) to permit the parties to agree on such terms in a 
plea agreement.”).   
 11 Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 233 
n.140 (2000) (finding that prosecutors may suggest departing from sentencing guidelines as one type 
of mechanism to receive favored testimony). 
 12 Harris, supra note 2, at 17 (explaining that the prosecutor must receive something from the defend-
ant in order to give something). 
 13 Steven M. Cohen, What Is True?  Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 818–
19 (2002). 
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scribes attorneys from “offer[ing] an inducement to a witness that is prohib-
ited by law.”14  All such incentivized evidence was excluded  as “tainted by 
the ethical violations.”15  Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court suspended 
from practice for eighteen months a defense attorney who paid a police of-
ficer $50 to testify truthfully.16  At least formally, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct are supposed to apply to prosecutors.17  Still, the rule against giving 
inducements to witnesses does not seem to be enforced against prosecutors.18  
Indeed, the “the practice has rarely been questioned.”19  
Federal and state laws also make a felon out of “[w]hoever” offers things 
of value in exchange for official acts or witness testimony.20  Although the 
 
 14 See Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 
1516, 1518, 1524 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that defendant’s counsel in an civil action violated Rule 
4-3.4(b) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct by paying fact witnesses to provide deposition 
testimony, and ordering that counsel “shall not be permitted to submit into the evidence . . . the 
testimony given in this case by any fact witnesses who received monetary compensation from” de-
fendant), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 117 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1997); see also J. Richard 
Johnston, Paying the Witness: Why Is it OK for the Prosecution, but Not the Defense?, 11 CRIM. JUST., Winter 
1997, at 23–24 (discussing Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b) and Golden Door). 
 15 Golden Door, 865 F. Supp. at 1518; see also Johnston, supra note 14, at 24 (quoting Golden Door Jewelry 
Creations, Inc., 865 F. Supp. at 1518).  See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Compensating Fact Witnesses: 
The Price Is Sometimes Right, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2014) (discussing legal doctrine concerning 
fact-witness compensation and caselaw on both sides).  
 16 In re Kien, 372 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ill. 1977); see also In re Howard, 372 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ill. 1977) 
(“The damage that would immediately accrue to our system of justice, should it be acceptable to 
pay for truthful testimony, is manifest.”).   
 17 See Harris, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing the rules, including Rule 3-3.1, on prosecutors in particular); 
see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-
3.2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/stand-
ards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition.html (“(a) A prosecutor should not compensate a witness, 
other than an expert, for giving testimony, but it is not improper to reimburse an ordinary witness 
for the reasonable expenses of attendance upon court, attendance for depositions pursuant to stat-
ute or court rule, or attendance for pretrial interviews.  Payments to a witness may be for transpor-
tation and loss of income, provided there is no attempt to conceal the fact of reimbursement.  
(b) . . . It is also proper for a prosecutor to so advise a witness whenever the prosecutor knows or 
has reason to believe that the witness may be the subject of a criminal prosecution.  However, a 
prosecutor should not so advise a witness for the purpose of influencing the witness in favor of or 
against testifying.”). 
 18 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 753 (2001) (show-
ing that Zacharias’s research assistants found thirty reported disciplinary cases involving Rule 
3.4(b), none of which were directed against prosecutors).   
 19 See Zacharias & Green, supra note 11, at 232 (“The rules have been interpreted broadly to forbid 
offering any inducements other than fair compensation for lost time.  As a practical matter, how-
ever, prosecutors have been exempt from this prohibition.  Prosecutors regularly offer witnesses 
inducements that are specifically prohibited by the terms of the rules.  Again, this practice has rarely 
been questioned.”) (footnote omitted). 
 20 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2012) (“(c) Whoever . . . (2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or 
promises anything of value to any person, for or because of testimony under oath or affirmation 
given or to be given by such a person as a witness upon a trial . . . before any court . . . shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”); see also David A. Sklansky, 
Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 518–19 (1999) (distinguishing 18 
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Supreme Court has not considered the question, the circuits seem to be in 
unanimity that federal prosecutors are above this law.  In one such case, a 
federal prosecutor enlisted Napoleon Douglas to testify against his co-con-
spirator, Sonya Singleton, in a money laundering and cocaine distribution 
scheme.21  The prosecutor explained to Douglas that he faced a very long 
sentence if convicted, and offered a deal that could greatly reduce his sen-
tence, depending on the “nature and extent” of his cooperation.22  A panel 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such a deal amounted to 
bribery, a landmark decision that could have caused a profound change to 
the practice of criminal law.23  The case was reconsidered en banc, on the 
question of whether “whoever” as used in the federal bribery statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c), applies to federal prosecutors who are acting as agents of the 
United States government.  Because the United States is a thing and not a 
person, the en banc court reasoned that “construing ‘whoever’ to include the 
government is semantically anomalous.”24   
This reasoning is both overinclusive and underinclusive.  The pronoun 
“whoever” appears throughout the criminal code, including in the crimes of 
falsifying or destroying records25 or transmitting national security infor-
mation,26 but the courts have not (yet) held that prosecutors are above those 
laws.  But even with regard to witness bribery, such reasoning would seem to 
apply to any person who is working on behalf of the Government, including 
public defenders.27  Yet they do not enjoy these powers.   
These anomalies suggest that the holding really is not about the text of the 
 
U.S.C. § 201 and its gratuity provisions, which have neither a falsehood nor a “corruptly” require-
ment, from 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1512, and discussing truth as a defense thereto).  But see United 
States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1425 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that an ordinary person would 
easily conclude exchanging testimony for anything of value constitutes bribery); United States v. 
Blaszak, 349 F.3d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that witness bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
201(c)(3), applies to truthful testimony). 
 21 United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999); see Timothy Hollis, An Offer You 
Can’t Refuse?  United States v. Singleton and the Effects of Witness/Prosecutorial Agreements, 9 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 433, 43547 (2000) (summarizing the facts of the case). 
 22 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298. 
 23 Id. (reviewing the facts of the case and summarizing the panel’s holding). 
 24 Id. at 1300; see also Nardone v. United States 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (providing the test for deter-
mining when a statute applies to the Government); Tracy A. Levin, Comment, Bribery or Effective 
Prosecution—Should Prosecutors Be Allowed to Give Something of Value to a Witness?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 137, 
143 (1999) (stating that the Nardone Court “set forth a canon of construction that [a] statute[ ] do[es] 
not apply to the government unless the statute (1) expressly states that it does, (2) would not cause 
the government to lose its sovereignty interests, or (3) would not be absurd to do so”). 
 25  18 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012). 
 26  18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012). 
 27 See generally Johnston, supra note 14 (explaining prosecutors and defense attorneys are subject to 
different standards for witness compensation, and arguing that “compensating a witness for testify-
ing involves an identical threat to the integrity of the judicial system whether the witness testifies for 
the prosecution or the defense”). 
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statute.  More importantly, the “ingrained practice of granting lenience in ex-
change for testimony has created a vested sovereign prerogative in the govern-
ment.”28  This prerogative seems to be constrained only by custom: the court 
claimed that “[o]ur conclusion in no way permits an agent of the government to 
step beyond the limits of his or her office to make an offer to a witness other than 
one traditionally exercised by the sovereign.”29  In short, tradition trumps law. 
At least ten other circuit courts have similarly held that § 201(c)(2) does 
not apply to prosecutors.30  In United States v. Smith, the court chided a defend-
ant for “rais[ing] an argument that has been rejected by every circuit that has 
considered it.”31  The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have explic-
itly extended the exemption beyond prosecutors trading leniency for testi-
mony, to monetary enrichment for testimony.32  Other courts have drawn 
 
 28 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301. 
 29 Id. at 1302. 
 30 Korin K. Ewing, Establishing an Equal Playing Field for Criminal Defendants in the Aftermath of United 
States v. Singleton, 49 DUKE L.J. 1371, 1395 n.115 (2000); see also, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 
195 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 1999) (“§ 201(c)(2) does not apply to the government when acting in 
accordance with its statutory authority . . . .”); United States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“[S]ection 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the government from promising leniency to cooperat-
ing witnesses in exchange for truthful testimony.”); United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 197 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (“[S]ection 201(c)(2) cannot be invoked as a bright-line barrier to the government’s use 
of witnesses whose cooperation has been secured by agreements not to prosecute or by promises of 
recommended leniency . . . . [S]ection 201(c)(2) does not apply at all to the federal sovereign qua 
prosecutor.”); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We . . . hold that 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United States or to any Assistant United States Attorney 
acting within his or her official capacity.”); United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 
1999) (holding that § 201(c)(2) does not apply where prosecutors offer to forgo prosecution or reduce 
a sentencing recommendation in return for testimony because “[f]orgoing criminal prosecution (or 
securing a lower sentence) is not a ‘thing of value’ within the meaning of § 201(c)(2)”); United States 
v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that §201(c)(2) “does not sweep so broadly 
as to prevent prosecutors from offering leniency to an individual in exchange for truthful testi-
mony”); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e hold that agree-
ments in which the government trades sentencing recommendations or other official action or con-
sideration for cooperation, including testimony, do not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).”); United 
States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e hold that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does 
not prohibit the Government from granting leniency in exchange for a witness’s truthful testi-
mony.”); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e must reject Haese’s 
contention that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) is violated when testimony is obtained in exchange for a fa-
vorable plea agreement.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 425 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven if we 
could make the great leap necessary to include prosecuting attorneys within the scope of § 201(c)(2), 
we would not apply the exclusionary rule to suppress the testimony of cooperating accomplices.”). 
 31 United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (invoking tradi-
tion, saying that it would not “prohibit the government from conferring immunity, leniency, and 
other traditionally permissible benefits upon cooperating witnesses in the course of a legitimate 
prosecution”). 
 32 United States v. Harris, 210 F.3d 165, 167 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 
310–11 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144–45 (5th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 394–95 (8th Cir. 1999).  
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the line at immunity and leniency, excluding other things of value.33 
Much of the prior commentary of this practice by courts and scholars has 
turned on sheer deference to tradition, narrow doctrinal analyses, or ex-
pressed conclusory normative concerns about the ethics of prosecutors.  
There are also accumulating anecdotes of wrongful convictions caused by 
prosecutors paying incentives to witnesses.  Some have proposed drastic re-
forms, without consideration of the full range of institutional constraints. 
We instead approach the problem using epistemology, behavioral science 
evidence, and institutional design.  Part I reviews the constitutional rights im-
plicated.  Part II offers a counterfactual method of analysis that reveals the 
causal relationships between truth, incentives, and testimony, and offers a 
framework for jurors and analysts to evaluate these practices and the testimony 
that depends on them.  Part III reviews literature from the behavioral sciences 
and describes three novel experiments, including the methods, results, and dis-
cussion of each.  In light of the disconcerting findings, Part III discusses two 
potential reforms that may reduce the risk of wrongful conviction.     
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPLICATED 
A constellation of constitutional rights is potentially implicated by the use 
of incentivized testimony in criminal cases.  Particular concerns arise if such 
testimony is unreliable.  Incentivized testimony, we argue, represents a sin-
gular divergence from many well established constitutional norms, though 
courts have not consistently recognized it as such.  
Incentivized testimony touches primarily on defendants’ rights to due 
process, to a trial by jury designed to weigh witness testimony for bias and 
veracity, and to not be punished when actually innocent.  As background we 
review these three fundamental rights before turning more directly to the 
doctrine on incentivized testimony in particular. 
First, defendants are entitled to be convicted only upon due process of 
law.34  Due process bars the state from “contriv[ing] a conviction through 
the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a 
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the 
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.”35  This bar against false 
testimony also extends to situations where the state merely fails to correct 
 
 33 See Mataya v. Kingston, 371 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2004) (“To pay in money [is forbidden]; im-
munity from prosecution, a lighter sentence, placement in a witness-protection program, and other 
breaks are lawful coin in this realm”) (first citing United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 688–91 
(7th Cir. 1999); then citing Singleton, 165 U.S. at 1302). 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 35 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).   
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false evidence.36  Thus, it is axiomatic that the knowing introduction of false 
testimony violates due process.  More generally, it also appears that due pro-
cess protects, in large part, the truth-seeking mission of the jury.  If incentiv-
ized testimony is unreliable and truth-thwarting, admission of such testimony 
may arguably implicate due process. 
Second, defendants have a right to trial by an impartial jury, functioning 
as factfinder in their case, and defendants can only be convicted on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.37  The Supreme Court has asserted that the 
rights provided by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments together with the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial “in-
disputably entitle a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is 
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.’”38  Of course, the assessment of a witness’s credibility has 
always been a primary function of jurors.  Nonetheless, if a jury were func-
tionally unable to properly weigh incentivized testimony, then the jury trial 
right would be arguably undermined in practice.  
Finally, defendants arguably have some form of due process right not to 
be punished while they are actually innocent.  In Herrera v. Collins, the Su-
preme Court noted a variety of protections designed to prevent conviction of 
innocent defendants, including the presumption of innocence and a number 
of the rights mentioned herein.39  Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted 
that at least in some capital cases, the Eighth Amendment barred the impo-
sition of sentence where the convicted was actually innocent.40  It is worth 
noting, however, that the Supreme Court did not expressly recognize a free-
standing constitutional actual innocence claim.41  One scholar’s reading of 
the concurrences in Herrera, however, suggests that a “shadow majority” of 
 
 36 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 
(1959)). 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–78 (2000). 
 38 Apprendi, at 476–77 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). 
 39 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1993). 
 40 See id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[E]xecuting the innocent is inconsistent with the Consti-
tution.”) 
 41 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether a prisoner 
may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”); see also John 
M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is 
There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 1453, 1465–66 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s analysis of whether a petitioner may 
use actual innocence to overcome the expiration of the statute of limitations on an appeal). 
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five justices recognized such a right,42 and lower courts have recognized free-
standing actual innocence claims.43  Thus, any conviction based on such tes-
timony would potentially touch on a defendant’s right not to be punished 
when actually innocent to the extent such testimony was not actually true. 
Incentives may also implicate a defendant’s equal protection rights. 
While prosecutors enjoy broad discretion, Judge Alexander J. Menza noted 
that, under Supreme Court law, a prosecution might violate equal protection 
“if the choice to prosecute is based on an arbitrary and unjustifiable classifi-
cation.”44  Menza argues that the grant of immunity may be a prime example 
of an Equal Protection Clause violation, as the decision of who to prosecute 
and who to immunize often is “based on impermissible considerations, bear-
ing no rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.”45  None-
theless, such a showing may be difficult in particular cases.46   
The foregoing review is largely aspirational.  Courts and commentators 
assume “that the danger from resulting incentives for perjury or shaped tes-
timony is adequately mitigated by disclosure, cross-examination, and cau-
tionary jury instructions.”47  “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation 
 
 42 Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, Actual Innocence after Friedman v. Rehal: The Second Circuit Pursues a New 
Mechanism for Seeking Justice in Actual Innocence Cases, 31 PACE L. REV. 627, 661–62 (2011); see also 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that it is unconstitutional to execute 
an actually innocent prisoner); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (arguing same); id. at 430–46 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing same). 
 43 See, e.g., In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *43 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (conclud-
ing that there was a cognizable actual innocence claim); Robinson v. Dinwiddie, No. CIV-07-
4320D, 2009 WL 2778657, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2009) (finding that there is an actual 
innocence claim in capital cases); Tomlinson v. Burt, 509 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776–77 (2007) (consid-
ering both  substantive and procedural claims of actual innocence); Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303, 
1312 (1996) (assuming, as did O’Connor’s concurrence in Herrera, that actual innocence may be the 
foundation for habeas claims in certain cases); Kirshbaum, supra note 42, at 663 (summarizing the 
Davis court’s actual innocence analysis); Matthew Aglialoro, Note, A Case for Actual Innocence, 23 
CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 635, 646 n.56 (2014) (listing cases theoretically supporting “a freestand-
ing claim of actual innocence”). 
 44 Alexander J. Menza, Witness Immunity: Unconstitutional, Unfair, Unconscionable, 9 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 505, 531 (1999) (arguing that granting a witness immunity in exchange for testimony results in 
unequal enforcement of the laws); see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (suggesting that 
selective enforcement of laws based on “unjustifiable . . . arbitrary classification[s]” may violate the 
Equal Protection Clause).   
 45 Menza, supra note 44, at 532. 
 46  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)(“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, 
McCleskey must prove that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”); 
United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 122 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he decision as to whether to prose-
cute generally rests within the broad discretion of the prosecutor, and a prosecutor's pretrial charg-
ing decision is presumed legitimate.”) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
 47 Harris, supra note 2, at 19; see also Spencer Martinez, Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who 
Testify in Exchange for Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 142 (1999) (“Clearly the most important 
safeguard against false testimony is the defendant’s right to cross-examine the cooperating witness 
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Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and par-
ticularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”48  
Indeed, the adoption of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment 
at the time of the founding was intended to prevent exactly these forms of 
incentivized but uncrossed evidence.49  The right to confront witnesses in-
cludes a right to conduct an effective cross examination.50  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court has held that where a court does “not permit defense counsel 
to ‘expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and 
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of 
the witness’ . . . such restrictions may ‘effectively . . . emasculate the right of 
cross-examination itself.’”51  Such a right is directly at issue when incentiv-
ized witnesses testify at trial. 
In addition to cross-examination courts direct that “the [trial] judge in-
struct the jury that in weighing the testimony of such witnesses they give ad-
equate attention to the motives which may underlie such testimony.”52   The 
Supreme Court “has long recognized the ‘serious questions of credibility’ in-
formers pose.  [It has] therefore allowed defendants ‘broad latitude to probe 
[informants’] credibility by cross-examination’ and [has] counseled submis-
sion of the credibility issue to the jury ‘with careful instructions.’”53  
The Supreme Court has held that, to satisfy due process, the prosecution 
must generally disclose incentives given to a witness and the defendant must 
also be given an opportunity to confront that witness regarding the incentive.54  
 
as to bias.”).  But see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truth-
fulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is 
upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s 
life or liberty may depend.”). 
 48 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
 49 Id. at 51.  We note, however, that there are exceptions to this rule.  See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (noting that where witness is unavailable due to defendant’s actions, tes-
timony is admissible); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 377–78 (2011) (noting Confrontation 
Clause does not bar admission of statements to law enforcement when given during an “ongoing 
emergency”) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822); see also Kelly Rutan, Procuring the Right to an Unfair 
Trial: Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) and the Due Process Implications of the Rule’s Failure to Require Stand-
ards of Reliability for Admissible Evidence, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 177, 182–94 (2006) (describing the excep-
tions to the Confrontation Clause). 
 50 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1985) (per curiam). 
 51 Id. at 19 (first quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974); then quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 
U.S. 129, 131 (1968)). 
 52 United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 53 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701–02 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting On Lee v. United States, 
343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952)).  As an aside, this rationale should apply equally to other contexts outside 
the criminal law.  For example, we might allow criminal defendants and civil litigants to bribe 
witnesses, if we thought that the informed factfinder could simply discount the testimony accord-
ingly. 
 54 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
(“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
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Under the current federal disclosure law, primarily set forth in Brady v. Maryland 
and Giglio v. United States, prosecutors are required to disclose all potentially-
exculpatory, material evidence, which includes evidence—such as the fact of 
incentives—that can be used to impeach a prosecution witness.55  However, 
Brady disclosures of impeachment evidence are not required at the defendant’s 
plea-bargaining stage, where the vast majority of cases conclude.56   
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court elucidated a defendant’s con-
stitutional rights as they pertained to the disclosure of information in a crim-
inal trial.57  The Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”58  Thus, under Brady, the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the prosecutor disclose po-
tentially exculpatory evidence when that evidence could be considered ma-
terial to the outcome of the trial.  Brady thus set forth a form of post hoc 
reasoning for appellate courts: a conviction should be overturned where a 
prosecutor did not provide evidence to the defense, and that evidence would 
have had some effect on the outcome of the trial.59 
 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”); see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (”[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”).  This requirement is subject to Brady’s materiality disclosure, however, 
and the Court reversed in Giglio, because the incentivized testimony was “an important issue in the 
case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant 
to [witness] credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it.”  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155.  
 55 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Cara Spencer, Prosecutorial Disclosure Timing: 
Does Brady Trump the Jencks Act?, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 997, 997–98 (2013) (describing what 
Brady requires); see also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683–84 (1985) (holding that 
prosecutors must disclose witness incentives to testify if disclosure of those incentives would materi-
ally affect the result of the trial); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 114 (1976) (applying 
Brady, but holding that nondisclosure of a witness’s prior criminal record was not material because 
“the arrest record was not requested and did not even arguably give rise to any inference of perjury 
[on the part of the witness with the record], . . . after considering it in the context of the entire 
record the trial judge remained convinced of respondent’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and . . . [the trial judge’s] firsthand appraisal of the record was thorough and entirely reasonable”); 
cf. DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ 
FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 140–141 (2016) (“[T]he disclosure duty’s limitation to ‘ma-
terial’ evidence, under a definition of materiality that means not merely ‘relevant’ but something 
that undermines confidence in a conviction[,] . . . leaves it to prosecutors to sort out, in private, what 
undisclosed information is meaningful enough to fall under the disclosure duty.”). 
 56 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution does not require the Govern-
ment to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”).  In U.S. district courts in 2001, there were 77,145 total defendants.  Of the 68,533 
defendants that were convicted, 64,894 pleaded guilty.  HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENT., 
UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17 (2003), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t517.pdf.  
 57 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–88. 
 58 Id. at 87. 
 59 Spencer, supra note 55, at 1002.  
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Over the following five decades, this rule has been expanded or explained 
in a few key ways.60  First, Giglio v. United States expanded the Brady disclosure 
rule to include evidence undermining witness credibility.61  Second, Brady’s 
materiality requirement was further elucidated to mean “when there is  ‘any 
reasonable likelihood’ [given evidence] could have ‘affected the judgment of 
the jury.’”62  Materiality is not understood to mean that a defendant “‘more 
likely than not’ would have been acquitted had the new evidence been ad-
mitted,” but rather that the “new evidence is sufficient to ‘undermine confi-
dence’ in the verdict.”63 
In addition, the Jencks Act requires that, after a witness for the prosecution 
has testified in open court, the prosecution disclose prior statements made by 
the witness, which may include contrary statements given prior to an incen-
tive deal being reached.64  The Jencks Act has a broader range than Brady, in 
that a party can request any statement that “relates to the subject matter as 
to which the witness has testified.”65  
The courts express resounding faith in the jury’s ability to use these man-
dated disclosures to calibrate its reliance on incentivized testimony.  Consider 
the First Circuit decision, United States v. Dailey.66  The district court found that 
the Government’s agreements with witnesses—that were explicitly contingent 
on the Government being satisfied with their testimony—were “so likely to 
induce perjurious testimony that to allow [the witnesses] to testify would be to 
violate defendant’s due process rights.”67  The court of appeals reversed, ex-
pressing “concern and uneasiness . . . over the coercive potential” of the agree-
ments but finding that the “traditional safeguards”—disclosing the agree-
ments to the jury, allowing cross-examination of the accomplices about the 
agreements and a cautionary instruction regarding the risks of the agree-
ments—were sufficient to protect the due process rights of the defendant.68 
Concomitantly with the requirement to disclose material evidence, due 
process protects a defendant against prosecutorial misconduct.69  Justice Mar-
shall, dissenting in United States v. Bagley, explained: “A deliberate effort of the 
 
 60 See Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016) (outlining the developments of the Brady doctrine). 
 61 Giglio, v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972) (clarifying that the rule stated in Brady applies 
to evidence undermining witness credibility). 
 62 Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1006 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). 
 63 Id. (quoting Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012)). 
 64 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). 
 65 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). 
 66 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 67 Id. at 193 (citation omitted).  
 68 Id. at 196. 
 69 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 n.8 (1985) (explaining that “the Brady rule has its 
roots in a series of cases dealing with convictions based on the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured 
testimony”).  
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prosecutor to undermine the search for truth clearly is in the category of of-
fenses antithetical to our most basic vision of the role of the state in the crim-
inal process.”70  In fact, some forms of prosecutorial misconduct might be 
deemed so egregious as to be beyond the scope of harmless error review.71  It 
is clear that a prosecutor commits misconduct by suborning perjury, but pros-
ecutions against states’ witnesses for perjury are rare.72  Further, proving pros-
ecutorial misconduct is difficult: a defendant must not simply show that the 
prosecutor was culpable of misconduct, but that the prosecutor’s misconduct 
created an unfair trial.73  Finally, prosecutorial misconduct can be difficult to 
define in the first place.  The Supreme Court has noted: “The line separating 
acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a gray 
zone.”74  But it appears that incentivizing witnesses, short of clearly suborning 
perjury,75 does not violate a prosecutor’s ethical duties.76  To obtain relief un-
der a prosecutorial discretion standard, a defendant would need to show, first, 
that a prosecutor knew the incentive would elicit false testimony, and even 
then, that the false testimony rendered the trial unfair.  This is a high bar to 
expect of criminal defendants in order to vindicate their due process rights. 
Overall, the use of incentivized testimony implicates the constitutional 
rights of defendants, and courts assume that the threat is largely mitigated by 
three imperfect solutions: disclosure by the prosecutor, cross-examination of 
the witness, and instruction of the jury.  Whether these mechanisms suffice is 
the question remaining.   
II.  A FRAMEWORK FOR CAUSAL INFERENCE 
A.  The Counterfactual of Non-Incentivized Testimony 
To understand the unique dangers posed by incentives, it is useful to care-
fully specify the counterfactual, i.e., the outcomes that would obtain but for 
a prosecutor’s offer of incentives.  Counterfactual reasoning can explain both 
 
 70 Id. at 704–05 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 71 Id.  
 72 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 61 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that knowingly 
using perjured testimony can be deemed prosecutorial misconduct); Johnston, supra note 14, at 22 
(“While it is common for the defense to claim that these witnesses commit perjury for rewards of 
money or leniency, there appears to be only one reported case in which an informer testifying as a 
government witness in a criminal case has been prosecuted for perjury.”) (citing United States v. 
Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 455 n.2 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 73 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 (1982) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 
(1976)). 
 74 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
 75 See Williams, 504 U.S. at 61. 
 76 See generally Johnston, supra note 14 (analyzing the extent to which prosecutors can compensate wit-
nesses without violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)).  
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why the prosecutor provides incentives, and how jurors should utilize incen-
tivized testimony.  
Our counterfactual analysis should begin with a recognition that wit-
nesses have all sorts of reasons for which they may prefer not to testify or 
prefer not to testify in a way that helps the Government.  They may want to 
avoid publicity, or they may have personal affinity for the defendant, or they 
may fear social opprobrium or retribution by the defendant’s friends or fam-
ily.  To make witnesses overcome such resistance to testifying substantively, 
prosecutors have a range of tools, shown in Table 1.  Most fundamentally, 
both prosecutors and defense attorneys enjoy the power to subpoena wit-
nesses to testify in court.77  Witnesses who refuse to testify can be jailed until 
they do so.78  If the prosecutor perceives that a material witness is likely to 
flee, the prosecutor can detain her.79 
Witnesses can take the Fifth, refusing to testify.  However, prosecutors 
can make a narrow grant of “use immunity,” as the minimum necessary to 
overcome a witness’s Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself or 
herself.  Congress formalized this narrow immunity in 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 
which allows witnesses to be compelled to testify, but prohibits prosecutors 
from using anything they say against them.80  Importantly, such immunized 
witnesses can still be prosecuted for their role in the crime to which they are 
testifying, if the prosecutor has sufficient other evidence.81  In this sense, the 
grant of use-immunity provides no real incentive for a witness to testify fa-
vorably to the prosecutor.82  
Similarly, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil attorneys can all pay 
a witness’s bona fide expenses (e.g., travel to court).83  If the witness fears 
retribution, the prosecutor can also pay for witness protection, including a 
 
 77 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. 
 78 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g). 
 79 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Material Witness Detentions after al-Kidd, 100 KY. L.J. 293 (2011) (discuss-
ing, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) and 18 U.S.C. § 3144). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012) (“Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding . . . and the person presiding 
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may 
not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no 
testimony or other information compelled under the order . . . may be used against the witness in 
any criminal case.”). 
81 Id. (limiting the immunity to the compelled testimony “or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony”). 
 82 See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1992) (“[T]he 
subject remains vulnerable to the possibility of a prosecution based on evidence not derived from 
the testimony compelled by the grant.  So narrow a protection may be an insufficient inducement 
to secure full cooperation.  The greater security of transactional immunity may be necessary to 
convince the subject to cooperate.” (footnote omitted)).   
 83 The bribery statute provides that compensation for time lost, travel, and subsistence are not forbid-
den.  18 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012). 
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new home and job.84  While useful tools for prosecutors, these also are not 
incentives, if they are carefully constructed to leave a witness at par, com-
pared to the counterfactual in which the witness does not testify favorably.  
Prosecutors can also go after the defendant or anyone else who tries to 
tamper with the witness’s truthful testimony.85  The Government can also 
attack changed or false testimony.  If a witness makes a statement to a grand 
jury or federal investigator, but then threatens to testify to the contrary under 
oath at trial, the prosecutor (but not the defense attorney) can threaten him 
with a false statements prosecution.86  A mere inconsistency with a prior 
statement to an investigator can be criminal, even if the prosecutor lacks in-
dependent evidence that the statement was false.87  Finally, the prosecutor 
(but not the defense attorney) can threaten prosecutions for perjury, to dis-
courage provably false testimony.88   
These powers, shown in in Table 1, form the backdrop for the use of 
prosecutorial incentives.  A prosecutor can compel a witness to testify sub-
stantively, and hold her to facts that are otherwise provable.   
  
 
 84 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b) (2012) (authorizing the federal government to pay witnesses but only to the 
extent “necessary to protect the person involved from injury and otherwise to assure the health, 
safety, and welfare of that person”); see also United States v. Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 
1999) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the plain purpose of [the] statute is protection, not 
compensation”). 
 85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2012) (criminalizing obstruction of justice, including by bribery of an inform-
ant); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (criminalizing tampering with a witness, victim, or informant); 
18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2012) (criminalizing retaliating against a witness). 
 86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012) (criminalizing false statements made to grand juries); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (2012) (criminalizing false statements generally); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 
477 (1984) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 applies to criminal investigations); cf. Brogan v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (holding that there is no Fifth Amendment right to lie to criminal 
investigators).   
 87 See United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1324 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Thus, under § 1623(c), the 
government had no burden to prove through extrinsic evidence the falsity of one of Flowers’ dec-
larations.  Rather, the statute allows contradictory statements without more to form the basis of the 
perjury prosecution, and permits the jury to infer the falsity of a declaration from its inconsistency 
with another.”). 
 88 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (criminalizing false statements under oath). 
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TABLE 1  
RANGE OF PROSECUTORIAL TOOLS  
Situation Prosecutor’s Tool Outcome 
Witness refuses to testify Subpoena Witness compelled to 
testify 




Witness appears in court 
Witness is likely to flee Detention as material  
witness 
Witness appears in court 
Witness invokes Fifth  
Amendment 
Use-Immunity Witness testifies 
 substantively 
Witness fears retribution 
or seeks benefits from  
defendants 
Witness protection  
program; prosecution of 
whomever tampers or 
bribes 
Witness not influenced 
by defendant 
Witness will testify  
contrary to prior  
statements to officials or 
grand jury 
Threat of false  
statements prosecution 
Witness testifies  
consistently with prior 
statements 
Witness will testify 
falsely, contrary to  
provable facts  
Threat of perjury  
prosecution  
Witness testifies  
truthfully  
Witness will not testify  
favorably to prosecutor 
Try case without the  
witness 
Risk losing 
Witness will testify  
unfavorably to  
prosecutor 
Incentives (leniency, 
broad immunity, cash, 
other things of value) 
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The transition to the bottom row is particularly important.  When the 
prosecutor finds that all of the foregoing techniques are insufficient, and the 
prosecutor feels insecure about her chances of proving the case without the 
recalcitrant witness, the prosecutor can turn to outright incentives instead.  
Let us put aside the possibility that some prosecutors are willing to use this 
power in bad faith to procure testimony that they believe to be false.89  These 
sorts of cases are less interesting because they are so obviously wrong.  In-
stead, let us presume good faith—the prosecutor believes that, without an 
incentive, the witness will feign ignorance or lie. 
This counterfactual analysis also shows that the primary function of prose-
cutorial incentives is to change the substance of what the witness will say, in the 
bottom row, where the prosecutor needs the testimony but the witness’s likely 
testimony is unhelpful.  The other tools allow the prosecutor to force the witness 
to appear and to testify, but she may say that she does not remember the key 
facts, or perhaps she will even exculpate the defendant.  Those responses are 
not satisfactory to the prosecutor, who then offers the incentive.  By offering 
incentives (even implicitly), the prosecutor can cause the witness to remember 
the key facts in a way that inculpates the defendant and helps the Govern-
ment.90  In doing so, the prosecutor’s incentives may well have converted false 
testimony into true, or vice versa.  The point here is merely that it has changed. 
This point may be difficult for the factfinder to appreciate, since we only 
observe the actual situation (with the incentive), not the counterfactual situation 
(without the incentive) for this witness.  A witness will insist that her inculpatory 
testimony is truthful.91  The witness will not generally concede that her testimony 
has changed because of the prosecutor’s incentive, because that may suggest that 
she is unreliable as a witness, reduce the value of the testimony to the prosecutor, 
and thus reduce the prosecutor’s willingness to pay for that testimony.   
 
 89 See Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
1381, 1381–92 (1996) (cautioning prosecutors about the ethical perils of using incentivized crimi-
nals as witnesses); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 942–43 (1999) (finding that prosecutors have confidence 
in their ability to detect lies).  See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: 
AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT, AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012) (exploring how even 
well-meaning prosecutors may contribute to wrongful convictions because of cognitive biases and 
an overly-deferential regime of legal and ethical rules). 
 90 Cohen, supra note 13, at 820 (“From the moment a defendant enters the federal criminal justice 
system, if not before, he is told of the advantages of cooperation.  It is a message that is delivered 
again and again by an array of friends and adversaries.  It is a message that is delivered by law 
enforcement agents, by defense counsel, by co-defendants and, if incarcerated, by fellow inmates 
and jailers.  The almost mystical qualities of cooperation—the prospect of receiving a substantially 
reduced sentence as a consequence of the filing of a letter by a prosecutor pursuant to Section 5K1.1 
of the Guidelines—is known to every criminal defendant.  To many defendants, cooperation has 
become synonymous with hope.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 91 Cf. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 67 (1978) (“Every lie necessarily implies—as does every 
assertion—an assurance, a warranty of its truth.”). 
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Nonetheless, if the factfinder assumes that both the witness and the pros-
ecutor are rational, then the factfinder could generally assume that any incen-
tivized witness did in fact change her testimony to secure the incentive.  As a 
former prosecutor explains, “To most rational criminal defendants, and most 
criminal defendants are rational, there is really no choice at all.”92  Tradi-
tional economic analysis predicts that witnesses will testify favorably, when 
given an incentive to do so.  Still, it is possible that witnesses are so altruistic 
in their concern for the truth that they do not behave as traditional econom-
ics would predict—an empirical question we explore below.   
The Government’s choice about whether to give an incentive is typically 
rational too.  If the witness would have testified favorably to the Government 
without the incentive, then the Government’s provision of the incentive 
would be an outright waste.  These incentives are costly to the Government, 
whether it is an opportunity cost in deterrence for a witness granted immun-
ity or leniency, or the money that is spent or foregone when the incentive is 
cash.93  Assuming that the Government somehow internalizes the cost of the 
incentive, and the Government is both rational and competent as a negotia-
tor (non-trivial assumptions, admittedly), then the Government will not pro-
vide such benefits to witnesses that would testify helpfully without those in-
centives.94  Thus the juror who observes an incentive should assume that 
without the incentive, the testimony would have been to the contrary. 
This method of reasoning should be familiar; we infer facts about the 
world from the rational behavior of actors in it.  If we observe a litigant de-
stroy a document, we assume it was unfavorable to his case.95  This method 
of reasoning also works up and down the scale of potential incentives.  If a 
prosecutor could have procured helpful testimony with merely a slight reduc-
tion of sentence, a competent and rational prosecutor would offer that rather 
than complete immunity.   
From this analysis, we cannot say whether the prosecutor’s incentive has 
evoked true or false testimony.  We can only say that the prosecutor caused 
 
 92 Cohen, supra note 13, at 819. 
 93 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.420 cmt. B.2 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.420 (“One of 
the principal arguments against the practice of plea bargaining is that it results in leniency that 
reduces the deterrent impact of the law and leads to recidivism on the part of some offenders.”).   
 94 But see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 86 
(2002) (explaining that line prosecutors may fail to internalize all the costs of granting leniency: 
“The problem is sometimes cast in terms of agency costs: The agent (the prosecutor) might sell the 
case to the defendant too cheaply while the principal (the public) is not paying attention.  Chief 
prosecutors . . . worry that their assistants will negotiate poorly [to make their] job easier.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (discussing silence as an indicator of guilt); 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence 
of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1020, 1022 (1978) (finding that juries make negative inferences 
from witness’s silence and are sometimes instructed by courts that they may do so). 
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the witness to testify as she did.  The testimony may be completely true, but 
the epistemic point is that the truth of the matter did not cause the witness to 
testify that way.  Instead, the incentive did so.96  To emphasize: this is not to 
say that the witness is lying or that the prosecutor has suborned perjury.  
Only that the evidence lacks epistemic value.   
B.  Saving the Epistemic Value of Incentivized Testimony 
From the foregoing analysis, one might conceive an incentivized witness 
to be like an actor in a theatrical play.  When one watches Shakespeare’s 
Coriolanus, and an actor comes upon stage playing the messenger to report 
that there was a battle raging at Corioli, and “spies of the Volsces held [him] 
in chase,”97 we do not consider the testimony to have any epistemic value 
whatsoever for the question of whether in fact there was such a battle involv-
ing such spies.  There may indeed have been such a battle and such spies (or 
not) but nobody supposes that a paid actor’s utterance on stage is evidence 
as to the truth of the proposition uttered.   
There are two potential paths of inference, which might save the epis-
temic value of incentivized testimony nonetheless.  We could rely on the pros-
ecutor’s knowledge and ethics, or on the witnesses’ ethics and an exogenous 
budget that prevents a deal between the prosecutor and witness. 
The first path is to suppose that prosecutors would not offer an incentive 
for testimony unless it were true.  Yet, a witness’s “value increases in inverse 
proportion to the information in possession of the prosecutor.”98  Precisely in 
those cases where the prosecutor has little other evidence of the truth is the 
temptation greatest to pay a witness to reveal the truth.  Indeed, prosecutors 
explain that they often must rely on a “gut reaction,” about whether the wit-
ness’s proposed testimony is truthful.99    
Prosecutors may also be biased by their role of being zealous advocates.100  
 
 96 Arguably, such testimony is irrelevant to a criminal case, in the strict legal sense.  See, e.g., FED. R. 
EVID. 401 (defining relevance as having “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence” where “the fact is of consequence in determining the action”); see 
also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1488 
(1999) (explaining that the testimony a trial lawyer brings forth is framed in terms of potential profit 
rather than truth). 
 97  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS act 1, sc. 6. 
 98 Cohen, supra note 13, at 822.  
 99 See id. at 822–23 (“[W]here limited information exists, it is oftentimes difficult to evaluate the ve-
racity of a would-be cooperator and the methods used to conduct such an evaluation are inherently 
inadequate.”); see also NATAPOFF, supra note 7, at 22 (describing the relationship between coopera-
tors and prosecutors). 
 100 See David Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 528 (1999) 
(“In the heat of litigation, facing zealous defense counsel, it can be hard not to think simply as an 
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As David Sklansky has observed, the official Department of Justice manual 
for federal prosecutors encourages them to consider whether the defendant’s 
cooperation could have “value” for putting away other defendants.101  Sklan-
sky notes, “The clear message is that credibility is important solely for deter-
mining how helpful the cooperation will be; the concern is less with truth 
than with forensic efficacy.”102   
Finally, even if trusting the prosecutor were a useful heuristic, this form of 
inference is contrary to core institutional commitments of the American criminal 
justice system, which presumes innocence rather than defers to prosecutors.103  
Prosecutors are not allowed to vouch for a witness or serve as a witness.104 
A second route is to suppose that social norms against lying constrain 
witnesses.  This behavior could also be due to a residual fear of perjury pros-
ecution (as minimal as that may be when the prosecutor is offering to pay for 
the testimony).  On this theory, even if incentivized, a witness is more likely 
to decline to testify favorably if the proposed testimony is false.  If testifying 
“X shot Y” is more likely when X actually shot Y, then the testimony has 
some epistemic value.  
Such a resistance to testifying falsely is understandable.  But it can be 
overcome.  The prosecutor has a wide range of potential incentives to offer.  
If a reduced sentence is not enough to procure “X shot Y” testimony, the 
Government can offer complete immunity, or add cash as well.  In addition 
to raising the incentive for compliance, the Government can also raise the 
stakes for non-compliance, charging additional crimes, prosecuting members 
of the family, seeking asset forfeiture, etc.105  Thus, the jury’s observation that 
an incentivized witness says “X shot Y” merely supports an inference that 
 
advocate.  And when a witness seeks leniency in exchange for damning evidence against the de-
fendant, it can be tempting to leave credibility assessments to the jury.  Nor is this simply a matter 
of getting caught up in the competitive nature of trial work.  Even in moments of detachment, many 
prosecutors may feel that it is not their job to judge the truth of testimony, only how it will play in 
the courtroom.”). 
 101 Id. at 528–29 (discussing UNITED STATES ATT’YS’ MANUAL § 9-27.420). 
 102 Id. at 529. 
 103 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); James Bradley Thayer, The Presumption of Innocence 
in Criminal Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185, 188–89 (1897). 
 104 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (explaining that a lawyer cannot 
allude to personal views about the credibility of a witness); id. r. 3.7 (prescribing rules for a lawyer 
as a witness); see also United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985) (“This venerable 
rule is a necessary corollary to the more fundamental tenet of our adversarial system that juries are 
to ground their decisions on the facts of a case and not on the integrity or credibility of the advo-
cates.  Accordingly, adherence to this time-honored rule is more than just an ethical obligation of 
individual counsel; enforcement of the rule is a matter of institutional concern implicating the basic 
foundations of our system of justice.”). 
 105 See Bruce A. Green, “Package” Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor’s Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 
507, 514–16 (1989) (discussing the ethics of threatening to charge family members of the actual 
targets of their investigations); Sklansky, supra note 20, at 523 (discussing the immunity deal Monica 
Lewinsky secured, which included immunity for her parents).   
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the Government succeeded in finding the right price that was sufficient to 
overcome whatever hesitancy that the witness had to say “X shot Y.”  With 
a potentially unlimited range of incentives the Government can offer, a wit-
ness saying “X shot Y” has no epistemic value. 
Suppose, however, that the Government is constrained in the amount of 
incentive that it can or will offer, and thus would sometimes fail to purchase 
the testimony it seeks.  For example, the witness may simply not be important 
enough to the case, and her own criminal behavior may be too egregious to 
warrant full immunity.  Or she might warrant full immunity, but not an allo-
cation of cash, which may require additional bureaucratic hassles.  At what-
ever the limit, the Government says, “take it or leave it.”  This supposition is 
of little help to the factfinder, who does not know that limit, and thus does not 
know whether the given incentive is below or at that level.  If the given incen-
tive is below that level, then the hypothesized de facto limit is irrelevant, since 
the Government successfully bought the testimony regardless.   
At best, the jury can speculate about whether the actual level of incentive 
would have been sufficient, in a world where X did not shoot Y, to nonetheless 
cause the witness to say “X shot Y” falsely.  This behavioral question can be 
conceived in terms of probabilities.  Suppose 100 similarly situated witnesses are 
given this same incentive, each in a world where X did not shoot Y.  What per-
centage of them would nonetheless say that he did so, in order to secure the 
particular incentive?  The larger this percentage is, the less weight the jury should 
give to the testimony.  If jurors can accurately make that assessment, then they 
will be able to discount the testimony of incentivized witnesses proportionately.  
Let us call this the “calibration hypothesis.”  Alternatively, jurors could 
overreact to an incentives disclosure (ignoring the substantive testimony al-
together, even though the incentive actually would cause no witnesses to lie) 
or underreact (believing the testimony even though a given incentive had a 
very large effect on witness’s willingness to lie).  In the following Part we re-
view observational and experimental evidence that can shed light on this 
question, as well as three novel experiments. 
III.  AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
A.  Prior Research 
We know that induced testimony is an important factor in wrongful con-
victions, but we have no reliable mechanism to estimate its scale.  In an anal-
ysis of 250 cases of wrongful convictions where DNA eventually exonerated 
the defendant, Brandon Garrett found that in 21% of the cases, the convic-
tion was secured through testimony by government informants—including 
jailhouse informants, codefendants, and confidential informants or cooper-
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ating witnesses.106  Among the 2130 exonerations registered by the Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1205 involved perjury or false accusations, though not all 
of these involved prosecutorial incentives, and most involved other factors as 
well.107  These sorts of observational studies are powerful, but they are sty-
mied by the exceeding rareness of finding a conviction to be wrongful due to 
the presence of physical evidence.   
More generally, social science finds that individuals respond to incen-
tives, including by lying if necessary.  The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a classic 
thought experiment used in game theory to demonstrate how rational indi-
viduals can make choices about whether to testify, regardless of the truth.108  
Witness incentives can lead to suboptimal collective outcomes for defendants 
while serving the interests of prosecutors, who can construct the game.  The 
basic structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game has been deployed in count-
less laboratory experiments.109   
In similar lab settings, social scientists have found it relatively easy to cre-
ate incentive structures that induce lying or the giving of biased advice.  For 
example, Sah and Loewenstein created a counting task, in which one party 
had better epistemic access to the truth than the other party (like a witness 
and a jury, schematically).110  When advisors were paid based on how high 
the advisee guessed, rather than based on the accuracy of the guess, the advice 
was dramatically inflated.  When advisors thought that the advisees had other 
sources of evidence available to them, the advice became even more biased. 
Research in the real world has found strong incentive effects.  For exam-
ple, companies successfully use incentives (“wages”) to get their employees to 
show up and work.  More interestingly, a study found that pregnant women 
were more likely to quit smoking if rewarded.111  Another found that, after 
lower-income families were given $55 per month contingent on their children 
 
 106 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 124 (2011); see also BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 126–57 (2000) (describing 
cases where a combination of forged DNA analysis and perjured witness testimony sent innocents to jail). 
 107 UNIV. CAL. IRVINE NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, MICH. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF L. & UNIV. 
OF MICH. L. SCH. & THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-
Map.aspx (start at initial page for total exonerations reported; then select “Present” for “Per-
jury/False Accusation) (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).   
 108 See Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE (2014), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/prisoner-dilemma (discussing the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma as created by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950). 
 109 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 411–12 
(2015) (describing the “informed prisoner’s dilemma” as a variant of the standard prisoner’s dilemma). 
 110 Sunita Sah & George Loewenstein, Conflicted Advice and Second Opinions: Benefits, but Unintended Conse-
quences, 130 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 89, 93–94 (2015). 
 111 David Tappin et al., Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation in Pregnancy: Randomized Controlled Trial, 
BRITISH MED. J., Jan. 27, 2015, http://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h134. 
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regularly attending school, drop-out rates decreased.112  Incentives can also 
lead to bad outcomes.  For example, studies have documented physicians 
changing their practice patterns to follow the money, even if it does not im-
prove patient outcomes.113 
Still, the evidence also shows that people are generally reluctant to out-
right lie, even when there is an incentive to do so.  In one laboratory game, 
participants were divided into two groups (senders and receivers) and the 
senders had the option to either tell the truth or lie.114  In one scenario, if the 
sender chose to lie, both the sender and the receiver would receive more 
money, yet a third of senders refused to lie.115  In another study where the 
players’ interests were adverse, almost half refused to lie.116  By manipulating 
the payoffs, the authors found that people are generally “sensitive to their 
gain when deciding to lie” and that individuals also care about “how much 
the other side loses.”117  Another study found that the more substantial the 
lie, the less likely a person is to lie.118   
There is also a broader literature on ethical behavior, finding that people 
will “behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude 
themselves of their own integrity.  A little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of 
profit without spoiling a positive self-view.”119  In six experiments, the re-
spondents cheated when given the opportunity, but the level of cheating was 
relatively low compared to the total cheating opportunities.120 
 The empirical literature on the reliability of eyewitness testimony has 
focused on the frailties of human memory, rather than on incentives to lie.121  
Nonetheless, several articles have focused on “secondary confessions” where 
an informant testifies that the defendant confessed to him.  In a study on a 
college campus, researchers gave a subgroup of participants an incentive to 
testify that they heard an accused individual confess, despite the fact that they 
heard the accused deny any wrongdoing.122  Nearly two-thirds (60%) were 
 
 112 Uri Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, 
at 5 (detailing effects of Mexico’s PROGRESA program). 
 113 See generally Christopher T. Robertson et al., Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health 
Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 452 (2012) (describing financial 
conflicts of interest in the healthcare context). 
 114 Sanjiv Erat & Uri Gneezy, White Lies, 58 MGMT. SCI. 723, 724–25 (2012). 
 115 Id. at 726. 
 116 Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 387–88 (2005). 
 117 Id. at 391.  
 118 Tobias Lundquist et al., The Aversion to Lying, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 81, 90 (2009). 
 119 Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J.  MKTG. 
RES. 633, 633 (2008). 
 120 Id. at 636. 
 121 See generally, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (7th prtg. 1996).   
 122 See Jessica K. Swanner & Denise R. Beike, Incentives Increase the Rate of False but Not True Secondary 
Confessions from Informants with an Allegiance to a Suspect, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 418, 422 (2010). 
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willing to testify falsely.123  A study with mock witnesses found that an incen-
tive to testify increased the rate of false but not true confessions, in situations 
where the witness and the suspect had allegiance.124   
Other studies have found that such secondary confessions can be impact-
ful on juries.125  One study found that mock juries did not discount jailhouse 
testimony when an incentive was offered.126  Another study concluded that 
mock jurors were “unaffected by the explicit provision of information indi-
cating that the witness received an incentive to testify.”127  On the other hand, 
Maeder and Pica found that incentives did have an effect on verdict deci-
sions, but the effect was not calibrated to the size of the incentive.128 
In criminal trials, of course, as noted above, prosecutors must disclose 
incentives paid to witnesses.129  Disclosure is a more general regulatory de-
vice, which has enjoyed more use than success.130  Empirical evidence sug-
gests that using disclosures to help decision makers calibrate how much to 
rely on advice is no more promising.131 
Even more, social science suggests that a disclosure mandate may also 
affect the behavior of the witnesses themselves.  Cain and colleagues con-
ducted an experiment involving a contrived game where individuals were 
put into the role of advisors (witnesses) versus estimators (factfinders), and the 
researchers also created a conflict of interest for the advisors, incentivizing 
them to give higher estimates regardless of whether they were true. 132  The 
 
 123 Id. at 424. 
 124 Id. at 425–426; see also Jessica K. Swanner et al., Snitching, Lies and Computer Crashes: An Experimental 
Investigation of Secondary Confessions, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 60–61 (2010) (finding that incentives 
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 125 See Stacy Ann Wetmore et al., On the Power of Secondary Confession Evidence, 20 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.  
339, 354 (2014) (finding that jurors viewed secondary confessions as more persuasive than other 
evidence). 
 126 See Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., Secondary Confessions, Expert Testimony, and Unreliable Testimony, 27 J. 
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Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 142 (2008). 
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566 (2014). 
 129 See supra text accompanying notes 57–63 (reviewing the Brady doctrine). 
 130 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).   
 131 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Biased Advice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 669–70 (2011) (finding that 
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 132 Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–11 (2005). 
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conflict of interest caused the advisors to provide self-servingly inflated advice 
(analogize to a witness being willing to lie when given an incentive to do so).  
When the advisors were required to disclose their conflict of interest, they 
gave even more biased advice, perhaps due to a sense that caveat emptor ab-
solves any moral motivation to tell the truth.133  Regrettably, the disclosure 
did not help the estimators make more accurate decisions; they worsened 
performance overall compared to the no-disclosure condition.134  This find-
ing was replicated in subsequent research.135  Other studies have found sim-
ilar effects in more realistic settings outside the lab.136 
This dynamic has not been specifically studied with regard to witness in-
centives in criminal trials, but the social science suggests that Brady disclosure 
mandates may perversely increase witnesses’ propensity to lie, if the witnesses 
are aware that their incentives will be disclosed to the factfinder.  This is just 
another factor a factfinder would then consider in trying to calibrate its reli-
ance on an incentivized witness. 
To test the doctrinal theory that juries can successfully discount credibility 
based on disclosures about incentives, the optimal experimental approach 
would allow observation of both the influence of the testimony on the factfinder, 
while at the same time observing the effect of any inducement on the witness’s 
willingness to so testify.  We present three experiments, two focusing on witness 
behavior, and a third that allows a direct test of the calibration hypothesis.   
B.  Experiment One—Witness Behavior Conditional on Truth and Incentives 
1.  Design 
To approach these empirical questions, it is useful to have a context in 
which we can specify the truth or falsity of the proposed testimony, and ma-
nipulate the incentive.  Only then can we estimate its effects. 
 
 133 Id. at 3, 9–11. 
 134 Id. at 13. 
 135 See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Dis-
closing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 836, 845 (2011) (finding in experiment involving 
estimation of home sale prices that estimators earned over one-third less money per house when 
the advisor’s conflicts of interest were disclosed than when they were not); Karim Jamal et al., Does 
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest Increase or Decrease Bias?, 35 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 89, 97 (2016) 
(finding that disclosure increased bias when the interests of the advisor and estimator were aligned, 
but finding no increase in bias when those interests were misaligned); Robertson, supra note 131 at 
669–70 (finding that laypersons provided with the mandated disclosure had worse outcomes than 
those who were not provided with the disclosure). 
 136 See, e.g., Sunita Sah et al., Effect of Physician Disclosure of Specialty Bias on Patient Trust and Treatment 
Choice, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7465, 7466–67 (2016) (finding that disclosure of physician 
bias toward surgery increased patient preference for surgery in both field and lab settings; physi-
cians in the field also increased the strength of their recommendation when they disclosed their 
bias). 
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Accordingly, we designed a randomized vignette-based experiment, 
which manipulated the truth or falsity of proposed testimony between-sub-
jects, and which sequentially offered four levels of incentives to give that tes-
timony within-subjects.  Our primary dependent variable was the respond-
ent’s willingness to provide the testimony sought by the Government. 
We used vignettes of approximately 850 words each, in which respond-
ents were asked to imagine themselves as an individual charged with a minor 
felony, which then created the predicate for the prosecutor to offer leniency.  
To reduce the difficulty that subjects may find imagining themselves as a 
criminal, we asked each respondent which of four felonies (state tax evasion, 
buying stolen car parts from a chop shop, drunk driving, or check kiting), 
they thought was most-often committed by otherwise law-abiding citizens.  
We then assigned them to imagine themselves in that situation, richly de-
scribed.  Respondents were told to imagine they were being charged with the 
crime, for which the penalties were a maximum of 3 years in prison and up 
to $270,000 in fines and fees (modeled on Arizona state law).  To further 
enhance subject engagement, each respondent was asked to write a few sen-
tences describing how they would feel if this situation were to befall them.  
Respondents were asked whether they would incriminate another inmate 
in a murder.  Although subjects were blinded, the facts of this crime were 
taken from the 1982 murder of Debra Sue Carter and subsequent prosecu-
tion and conviction of Ron Williamson, who was later exonerated.137  That 
case turned on a witness who testified that Williamson confessed to the crime 
while in jail.138  In our vignettes, the respondent was placed in a cell next to 
Williamson—renamed Fredrickson for the experiment139—and detectives 
questioned the respondents about him.  Our detectives explained they had a 
significant body of other evidence about the murder, but needed something 
more substantial to ensure a conviction over any “technicalities” that may be 
raised by the defense counsel. 
In the next page of our experiment, subjects were randomized into one of 
two conditions.  In the first condition (truth), subjects were informed that they 
had indeed heard Frederickson confess to the murder, including certain specific 
details regarding the motive and method of the murder.  In our other condition 
(falsity), the subjects were informed that they did not hear any confession, but 
 
 137 See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE 
IT RIGHT, 168–202 (2001) (discussing the Williamson case in detail); BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 129, 131 (2011) 
(summarizing same).  We changed the name in the vignettes to minimize recognition. 
 138 DWYER ET AL., supra note 137, at 175–76, 190 (noting the evidentiary issues in the case and high-
lighting the significance of the witness’s false testimony that Williamson had admitted to committing 
the crime).  
 139 We used the name Fredrickson rather than Williamson to avoid any subjects recognizing the facts 
of the historical case. 
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instead had the impression Frederickson was merely an older man with an al-
cohol dependence.  They were also given the same details regarding the motive 
and method of the murder, gleaned from media coverage of the crime. 
In both experimental groups, subjects were then presented with an in-
creasing series of incentives to testify that there was in fact a jailhouse confes-
sion.  At the first stage (Level 1), the prosecutor offered leniency, which would 
substantially reduce the maximum penalty of three years’ prison-time to 12–
24 months’ prison time, in exchange for favorable testimony.  Those that 
declined to testify moved to the second stage (Level 2), where the prosecutor 
offered a further reduction in prison time, and a complete reduction in fines 
or fees.  At the third stage (Level 3), the prosecutor offered total immunity—
a complete reduction in prison time and fees.  Finally, at the fourth stage 
Level 4) the prosecutor offered the subjects complete immunity, plus “a few 
thousand dollars a month” in financial support while the subjects testified for 
the state—an incentive that falls squarely within the realm of the incentives 
actually offered by prosecutors.140 
At each increasing stage, a defense attorney advised the subjects both that 
offering false testimony is a serious crime, as well as the practical implications 
of the offered deal.  At certain stages, the prosecutor made attempts to con-
vince the subjects to testify; at the third incentive level, for example, the pros-
ecutor urged the subjects to prevent “a violent sexual predator” from going 
free.  Further, the third incentive level was presented as a firm offer.   
At each incentive level, our primary dependent variable was whether the 
subjects were willing to testify in a way that inculpated the defendant, favor-
ably to the Government.  To further enhance realism and maximize the dis-
cordance involved with giving false testimony, we also asked subjects to type 
out their exact testimony in as much detail as they could remember (or con-
trive in the falsehood condition).   
2.  Results 
We recruited a diverse group of 440 respondents from an online pool.141  
Respondents spent approximately ten minutes completing the experiment.142  
As shown in Figure 1, in the false testimony group, 7% were willing to lie in 
exchange for the lowest level of incentive.  The willingness increased with in-
creasing incentive pressure, to 10%, 15%, and 20% for levels 2, 3, & 4, respec-
tively.  In the truthful testimony condition, a quarter of respondents refused to 
 
 140 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also McKinley, supra note 5  
 141 We used Amazon Mechanical Turk, paying $1.25 per response.  This group was 49% male; 81% 
White; 7% Black; 6% Asian; and 6% Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino.  In terms of education, 14% 
had a high school degree or less, 71% had at least some college credit but not advanced degrees, 
and 15% had advanced degrees. 
 142 Average time to complete was 10:21. 
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testify, even with a small incentive.  Ultimately, a cumulative 94% of respond-
ents were ultimately willing to testify when the proposed testimony was truthful.  
Witnesses in our experiment were less likely to offer false than true testi-
mony, even when incentivized.  We can reject the null hypothesis and say 
that, to the extent our sample is ecologically valid, witnesses are less willing 
to give false testimony than true testimony (p < 0.001, 95% CI = .66 - .79).  
Our results also suggest that witness testimony is affected by prosecutorial 
incentives.  Incentives appear to elicit false testimony in a significant minority 
of respondents.  And, the process of wearing down a witness by sequentially 
offering increasing levels of incentives is successful, nearly tripling the rate of 
false testimony. 
FIGURE 1 
WITNESSES’ WILLINGNESS TO TESTIFY FOR GOVERNMENT, CUMULATIVE 
PERCENTAGE AT FOUR LEVELS OF INCENTIVES, BY TRUTH OF TESTIMONY, 


















Level 1 = Leniency by reducing the maximum penalty of three years prison 
time to 12–24 months prison time.   
Level 2 = Further reduction in prison time and a complete reduction in fines 
or fees.   
Level 3 = Total immunity.   
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3.  Discussion  
Our study has strengths and limitations.  On the one hand, we used an 
extensive vignette, including customizations to make it seem more realistic 
and a writing task to enhance engagement.  Our use of a randomized design 
maximizes internal validity, as it distributes observable and non-observable 
covariates and allows causal inference.   
On the other hand, ecological validity is the challenge for this sort of re-
search: we used experimental vignettes, rather than real police interrogations 
of a witness facing real criminal jeopardy.  Vignettes have become a common 
tool in a range of scientific and practical fields including sociology, psychol-
ogy, business, and health sciences.143  Vignette-based experiments are now 
published in the leading scientific journals, to predict real-world behaviors.144  
Our vignettes also focused on a particular fact pattern.  A case putting 
the witness in greater criminal jeopardy could increase willingness to testify 
(or vice versa).   
Nonetheless, one out of five respondents are willing to testify falsely in a 
case with profound consequences for the criminal defendant, including the 
death penalty.  One would hope that this sort of behavior is extremely rare, 
comparable to the percentage of people who succumb to the temptation to 
rob a bank or to kill a relative to secure an insurance payout, presumably far 
less than 1% of the people that have the opportunity to do so.  To the con-
trary, our data suggest that the human tragedy of the Williamson case is not 
an extreme outlier based on the aberrant behavior of an individual miscreant 
willing to testify falsely, but rather may be a relatively commonplace phe-
nomenon of individuals willing to act rationally when put in a situation to do 
so.  A 20% rate of individuals willing to lie for the Government is several 
orders of magnitude higher than one might hope for. 
 
 143 See Jessica L. Collett & Ellen Childs, Minding the Gap: Meaning, Affect, and the Potential Shortcomings of 
Vignettes, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 513, 513 (2011) (listing these fields in particular); see also Geert M.J. 
Rutten et al., Measuring Physiotherapists’ Guideline Adherence by Means of Clinical Vignettes: A Validation 
Study, 12 J. EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRAC. 491, 498 (2006) (concluding that vignettes are of ac-
ceptable validity for predicting guideline adherence in physiotherapy practice); D. Alex Winkelman 
et al., An Empirical Method for Harmless Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405, 1417–18 (2014) (surveying this 
and other literature exploring the validity of vignette-based decision making to predict real world 
behavior, including jury behavior).  See generally Rhidian Hughes, Vignette Technique, in THE SAGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 1184 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. 
eds., 2011) (describing the form, purpose, applications, and criticisms of vignettes). 
 144 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., A Randomized Study of How Physicians Interpret Research Funding 
Disclosures, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1119, 1120–24 (2012) (finding, in experiment using hypothetical 
scenarios involving the evaluation of new drugs to treat various disorders, that disclosure of industry 
sponsorship negatively influenced physicians’ perceptions of a study’s methodological rigor and 
their willingness to believe and act on trial findings).  
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Still, there is reason to believe that our experiment actually underesti-
mates the rate at which jailhouse witnesses are willing to testify falsely for the 
Government.  There are three reasons. 
The first is a sampling error.  The population of individuals sitting in jails 
are presumably more willing to commit criminal acts—including perjury—
compared to our population of online workers.145  Our population is also 
more highly educated, which predicts a lower incidence of future crime than 
the population of people sitting in jails.146  
The second reason is optimism, or a related phenomenon of over-predic-
tion of moral behavior.147  The vignette asked respondents to predict whether 
they would testify falsely if they someday found themselves in the given situa-
tion, but people often imagine themselves to be more honest and more altru-
istic than they really are.148  For example, individuals were shown to over-
estimate their own voting behavior by about 24%.149  Generally, individuals 
tend to see themselves in a positive light, and the suggestion that they would 
perjure themselves in the given situation creates cognitive dissonance.150  It 
is easier to reject the minor premise (I would lie in this situation) than the 
major premise (I am a good person).   
 
 145 See What Is the Probability of Conviction for Felony Defendants?, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403 (last visited Sept. 23, 2017) (stating that most of 
those charged with felonies in the previous year were eventually convicted); Recidivism, NAT’L INST. 
JUST. (last updated June 17, 2014), http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/wel-
come.aspx (reporting statistics showing that a large percentage of released prisoners relapse into 
criminal behavior). 
 146 See Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, 
Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 161–62 (2004) (finding “that an additional year of 
schooling reduces the probability of incarceration by 0.1 percentage points for whites and by 0.37 
percentage points for blacks”). 
 147 See Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced 
by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 871–72 (2000) (“Par-
ticipants overestimated how likely they were to buy a daffodil to support the American Cancer 
Society . . . , to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma . . . , to donate part of an experimental partici-
pation fee to charity . . . , and to shackle themselves rather than a partner to a longer and more 
unpleasant experimental task . . . . They also overestimated how sensitive their behavior would be 
to moral sentiments and underestimated how responsive they would be to self-interest con-
cerns . . . .”). 
 148 See Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, The Mixed Blessings of Self-Knowledge in Behavioral Prediction: En-
hanced Discrimination but Exacerbated Bias, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 641, 641–42 
(2006) (reviewing the literature showing self-serving biases in predicting one’s own “socially or mor-
ally desirable behavior,” specifically that “[p]eople tend to overestimate, for example, how likely 
they are to donate time or money to charitable causes, complete important tasks ahead of schedule, 
and maintain their current romantic relationship”). 
 149 Id. at 646 (finding that the actual voting rate of study participants in the upcoming presidential 
election was 66%, while 90% of participants had predicted they would vote). 
 150 See generally SHELLY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE 
HEALTHY MIND (1989) (explaining many ways in which well-adjusted individuals rely upon some-
times illusory positive self-image in everyday life). 
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A third reason is social desirability bias.  Some respondents may over-
come optimism to realize that they would in fact lie for the prosecutors in the 
given situation, but may still be unwilling to admit that fact when answering 
our questions.  Prior research has shown that people tend to respond to sur-
veys in ways that are socially acceptable, for example under-reporting their 
propensity to engage in criminal activity or risky sexual behaviors.151  In one 
laboratory study for example, participants were surreptitiously observed as 
to whether they cheated on a test, and then later surveyed about whether 
they had done so within the last year.152  When guaranteed confidentiality, 
only 25% of the cheaters admitted on the survey to having done so, and when 
another group was allowed to respond anonymously only 74% of the cheat-
ers admitted having done so.153  The survey thus underestimated the actual 
rate of cheating by 26%.  Here, although the anonymity we afforded to re-
spondents likely facilitated some candor, a number of respondents who 
would in fact testify falsely in the given situation likely failed to honestly re-
port their willingness to do so.    
All three of these biases would point in the direction of a greater effect, 
making conservative our estimates of the likelihood that an incentivized wit-
ness would lie.  The real rate at which witnesses behave rationally when put 
in the situation to do so may be much larger than the 20% we observed. 
In our true testimony condition, we see that incentives still play a role in 
increasing willingness to testify.  Our results suggest that potential witnesses 
have some predisposition against testifying, even when incentivized and in 
the face of legal jeopardy.  It is possible that this result is affected by the same 
biases as our untrue condition.  It is possible that our sample was more willing 
to testify truthfully than those actually facing criminal jeopardy would be in 
a similar circumstance.  It is likewise possible that our respondents are overly 
optimistic about their willingness to testify in court against someone charged 
with murder; those actually facing criminal charges might be less likely to 
testify truthfully in light of their impending term in a correctional facility.  
Finally, social desirability bias could have potentially inflated the rate of true 
testimony; the social and economic burdens of being a state’s witness might 
discourage more individuals in a real situation.  
 
 151 Thea F. van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias in Self-Report Research, AUSTL. J. ADV. 
NURSING, June–Aug. 2008, at 42 (2008) (reviewing 14,275 studies where socially desirable respond-
ing (SDR) might be a factor and finding that of those that used a social desirability scale, 43% found 
SDR to be a factor); see also Cindy M. Meston et al., Socially Desirable Responding and Sexuality Self-
Reports, 35 J. SEX RES., 148, 156 (1998) (finding that the results of anonymous sexuality self-reports 
are influenced by social desirable responding). 
 152 Anthony D. Ong & David J. Weiss, The Impact of Anonymity on Survey Responses to Sensitive Questions, 30 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1691, 1697–99 (2000). 
 153  Id. at 1699. 
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From the perspective of a juror, the task of correctly discounting incen-
tivized testimony is even more difficult, because of a multiple-selection prob-
lem.  A particular criminal defendant who is jailed may have the opportunity 
to interact with several, perhaps even dozens, of potential witnesses for the 
prosecution.  If the prosecution offers a deal to each one, and the real-world 
chance of eliciting false testimony is remotely similar to the effect we ob-
served, the Government is almost guaranteed to find one witness willing to 
testify in an inculpatory way, regardless of the truth.  For example, even as-
suming our conservative estimate that one out of five (20%) of individuals 
would be willing to lie, if the prosecutors ask a dozen people who interacted 
with the defendant, there is a 93% chance that at least one of them will fail 
to resist the temptation to testify falsely for the Government.154     
C.  Experiment Two—The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure of Witness Incentives on 
Witness Behavior 
In a second experiment, we move beyond jailhouse snitch scenarios to 
test a case in which the witness potentially faced jeopardy in the same case as 
the defendant, and again test whether willingness to lie is sensitive to the 
amount of incentive offered.  We also sought to explore the effect of Brady’s 
mandatory disclosure of witness incentives on witnesses’ willingness to lie. 
Accordingly, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, manip-
ulating whether the witness was offered a small incentive (leniency leading to 
a guilty plea with probation) versus a large incentive (outright immunity from 
prosecution), and whether the respondents were reminded that any incentive 
would be disclosed to the jury versus no such reminder.  In all conditions, the 
respondents knew that the Government’s proposed testimony would be false. 
1.  Design 
We again put respondents in the role of a potential witness in a criminal 
case, with vignettes of approximately 900 words each, this time modelled on 
the actual criminal case of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman.155  This 
case largely turned on the testimony of a single witness, the Governor’s top 
aide, who testified that a corporate CEO’s $500,000 contribution to a political 
action committee advocating for a state lottery to fund education was actually 
a bribe of the Governor, in exchange for reappointment to a state board.156  
 
 154 This result is calculated by subtracting the 20% rate of willingness to lie from 100%, to find a refusal 
rate of 80%.  That proportion raised to the 12th power, is 7%, which reflects the chance that 12 
out of 12 of the prisoners offered the deal would reject it.  100% minus 7% is the chance that at 
least one would accept the deal.  
 155 United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 156  Id. 
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We changed the names and simplified other case facts, for example, by exclud-
ing a motorcycle, which was also alleged to be part of the bribery conspiracy.   
After Siegelman was convicted, a whistleblower named Tamara Grimes 
alleged that the prosecutors had used a wide range of tactics to incentivize 
witnesses, even coaching the particulars of their testimony.157  The prosecu-
tors met over 70 times with one key witness—the Governor’s key aide, Nick 
Bailey—who ultimately provided the damning testimony linking the political 
contribution to the board appointment.158  A group of 52 former attorneys 
general asked Congress to investigate the case, and 116 supported Siegel-
man’s unsuccessful appeals.159  So the case is of particular interest for the 
question of prosecutors using inducements for and pressure on witnesses.   
In all our experimental conditions, respondents were told that the FBI’s 
theory that there was an explicit exchange agreement was false.  (As research-
ers, we do not know the truth of the actual Siegelman case; we stipulated false-
ness for experimental purposes only.)  Contrary to the FBI’s theory, the vi-
gnette provided that the witness did not hear the Governor tell a lobbyist that 
the CEO needed to pay up; he did not meet privately with the CEO on mul-
tiple occasions; and when the check came in,  he did not explicitly 
acknowledge that it was “for” the board seat.160  The vignette reiterated the 
falseness of the Government’s theory at some length a second time.161    
The experiment manipulated the inducements offered and the salience 
of disclosure.  The actual inducements that prosecutors offered to the key 
witness, Nick Bailey, were complicated.  For the purpose of our vignette, we 
simplified them in one condition to be simply an offer of complete immunity: 
he would not be prosecuted for his involvement in the case.  In another ran-
domly-assigned condition, the witness was offered the opportunity to plead 
guilty to reduced charges, with a recommendation that he or she would serve 
no prison time but would pay a fine and serve probation.  To get either deal, 
the witness would have to waive any Fifth Amendment rights and testify in a 
way that inculpated his boss in bribery.  In both conditions, the respondent’s 
attorney explained that declining the deal was a perilous proposition: 
 
 157 Exhibit III-K at 2, United States v. Scrushy, 237 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 158 Id. at 3. 
 159 Brief of Former Attorneys General as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Siegelman v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016) (No. 15-353), 2015 WL 6445856; Did Ex-Alabama Governor Get a Raw 
Deal?, CBSNEWS (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-ex-alabama-governor-get-
a-raw-deal/. 
 160 “Thinking back on all of this, it is true that the CEO made the contributions, and the Governor 
gave him the appointment.  But, you never thought this was a bribe!  In your line of work this sort 
of behavior happens all the time—officials and donors simply build goodwill, since they have to 
work together.  You never would have participated in anything like a bribe!” 
 161 “You know that the FBI’s theory is false.  You heard those conversations, and the Governor never 
told the lobbyist that the CEO needed to spend money to get the board seat.  There was no secret 
meeting.  And when the checks came in, the Governor did not say they were for the board seat.  
Instead, this was all just politics.  You are absolutely sure there was no bribe.” 
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If you do not help the Government, you may become a target.  They will 
assume that you are just trying to help your boss.  The Government may 
give immunity to somebody else to testify against you both, and they are 
suggesting that the CEO may testify for the Government.  Keep in mind 
that the Government wins over 85% of its trials, and you are facing 20 years 
or more if convicted.  Your attorney tells you to think of your family and 
what a trial will put them through.  Your attorney emphasizes that only you 
really know whether there was an explicit agreement to exchange the money 
for the board seat.  So you should choose your words carefully. 
All respondents were then asked, “What would you most likely do in this 
situation” and given two choices: (1) “Agree to testify for the FBI that the 
CEO and the Governor made an explicit agreement to exchange $500,000 
for an appointment to the board,” or (2) “Refuse to testify for the FBI that 
the CEO and the Governor made an explicit agreement to exchange 
$500,000 for an appointment to the board.”   
To increase the realism and engagement with the case, in all conditions, 
those that declined were given a second chance: 
Your attorney reminds you that if you do not testify, you will almost certainly 
be prosecuted by the FBI for bribery.  Your attorney again reminds you that 
the government will likely win the case it brings against you. 
We hypothesized that the Brady rule’s mandatory disclosure of witness 
incentives may actually increase witnesses’ willingness to lie.  Accordingly, 
half of the respondents were randomly assigned to be told: 
Your attorney also informs you that if you testify under a deal with the pros-
ecutor, it will be fully disclosed to the jury.  The Governor’s attorney will ask 
you questions about whether or not you are giving biased or untrue testi-
mony because of the deal, all of which the jury will see. 
In the disclosure condition, those that initially declined to testify were 
further prompted, “Your attorney also reminds you that testifying and ac-
cepting the deal will be fully disclosed to the jury, who will then decide what 
to believe.”  To ensure the salience of this point we also asked, “Do you un-
derstand that accepting your deal with the prosecutor will be fully disclosed 
to the jury?”  
Across all those who initially declined in both conditions, the second 
chance was posed as, “Now, are you willing to testify for the FBI in exchange 
for the deal?”  Options were “yes” or “no.”   
As a secondary dependent variable, respondents were also asked, “How 
certain are you about your choice?”  Responses were on a six-point Likert 
scale,162 with anchors defined as “certainly would testify for the FBI” to “cer-
tainly would not testify for the FBI.” 
 
 162 Named after psychologist Rensis Likert, the Likert scale is a common survey method that 
asks respondents to measure the strength of their reactions to a number of statements.  
Presented with a statement, respondents choose between a scaled range of responses—
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We fully crossed the two variables (incentive: high | low and disclosure: 
salient | not).  Thus, there were four conditions and each respondent an-
swered one vignette, which had one value for each variable. 
2.  Results 
For this second experiment, we recruited a diverse group of 209 respond-
ents from an online population.163  As shown in Figure 2, we found substan-
tial willingness to lie for the Government in order to secure the offered in-
centive.  Overall, on the initial offer, across both incentive levels, 41% of 
respondents said that they would agree to testify falsely that the CEO and 
the official had made an explicit bribery agreement.  After being reminded 
of the risks the witnesses faced if they refused (and reminded of the disclosure 
mandate in that condition), another 14% agreed to testify falsely.  This very 
brief iterative process shows how a witness can be ground down over time.  
Together then, more than half (55%, CI: 48–62%) of respondents were will-
ing to testify falsely in this second experiment. 
We also split our sample by the two manipulated variables—size of in-
centive and salience of disclosure.  At the first stage, we found that the will-
ingness to lie was higher (46%) when the Government offered full immunity 
than when the Government offered mere fine and probation (37%), though 
we cannot rule out the null hypothesis (p = 0.11).  By the second phase, the 
difference shrinks slightly (p = 0.18).   
We found that reminding the witnesses twice that any deal would be dis-
closed to the jurors made no difference (p = .82, CI: -13–16%)).  In fact, the 
observed 2% insignificant difference was in the opposite direction of that hy-
pothesized.   
We found no substantial trends in the six-point Likert scale dependent 
variable.  We also found no interesting interaction between the two variables.   
  
 
generally, strong disagreement, disagreement, uncertainty, agreement, and strong agree-
ment (or some equivalent). The responses are assigned ordinal numbers, which make pos-
sible analytical methods such as comparison on narrow issues, correlation between issues, 
and individual or group tallies that reveal information about larger blocks of attitudes or 
behavior. 
  Likert Scale, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Craig Calhoun, ed., 2002).   
 163 We again used Amazon Mechanical Turk, paying $1.25 per person.  Respondents were 65% male.  
In terms of ethnicity, 75% identified as White; 8% Black/African-American, and 12% Asian.  Sep-
arately, 7% identified as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino.  In terms of education, 17% had a high 
school degree or less, 70% had at least some college credit but not advanced degrees, and 14% had 
advanced degrees. 
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FIGURE 2 
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE FALSE TESTIMONY BY SIZE OF  
INCENTIVE AND SALIENCE OF DISCLOSURE MANDATE, WITH 95% 
















3.  Discussion 
We acknowledge the same limitations as for Experiment One.  This was 
a vignette-based experiment.  It likely underestimates the risk that witnesses 
will give false testimony when incentivized to do so, for many of the same 
reasons discussed above.  Real incentives will be even more salient, and our 
respondents likely succumb to optimism and social desirability biases.  
 It is striking that we observe much greater willingness to lie in Experi-
ment Two compared to Experiment One.  It is possible that the stakes of 
refusing to lie were perceived to be higher in the second experiment, where 
the respondent was in the role of an innocent person who faced 20 years 
imprisonment on a crime he did not commit, versus the first experiment 
where the respondent was in the role of a person guilty of a minor felony.164  
Alternatively, respondents may have viewed the facts in the bribery case to 
be sufficiently odious that they were willing to inculpate the defendants, even 
if they were not technically guilty of the crime. 
 
 164 But see Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
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This second experiment is consistent with our earlier finding that willing-
ness to lie is sensitive to the amount of incentive offered.  Unsurprisingly, 
bigger incentives cause more lying. 
We were surprised to find that the disclosure reminders did not increase 
the willingness to lie, as prior social science research suggests.  The prior liter-
ature tests this phenomenon in a domain where respondents are assigned a 
conflicting interest and are required to provide advice to a factfinder.  There 
the decision is just about what advice to give.  Furthermore, the advisors them-
selves generally had uncertainty about the true value and gave the advice in a 
scalar way (e.g., “there is $3.72 worth of coins in the jar”).  Here, in contrast, 
the choice is distinct: will you accept an incentive and give a particular sort of 
binary information to the jury?  This setting bundles the question of whether 
to accept an incentive with the binary question of whether to give the advice.  
Prior research shows that a disclosure mandate can cause individuals to de-
cline financial relationships that may be perceived as biasing them.165  This 
effect points in the opposite direction as the hypothesized “moral licensing” 
effect166 and may have washed it out in the legal context that we simulated. 
Another possible difference between this setting and the classic lab exper-
iments is that we did not actually have a no-disclosure condition.  Instead, 
we simply notified respondents in one condition that their incentive would 
be disclosed, and we were silent on the question in the control condition.  It 
is possible that our respondents were tacitly aware of the disclosure norms in 
U.S. criminal law, even without our reminder.  Thus our experimental de-
sign is not a perfect test of the counterfactual world in which disclosure is 
actually not required at all.  
D.  Experiment Three—Comparing Witness Behavior and Jury Evaluations 
We sought to again test the ubiquitous situation in which the witness poten-
tially faces jeopardy as a codefendant in the same case as the defendant, and we 
sought to explore the jury calibration hypothesis more directly, by testing both 
the witness perspective and the jury perspective in the same case.  We sought to 
observe the counterfactual, of what the witness would do without the incentive, 
and to then also observe what a jury would do without the witness having the 
 
 165 Genevieve Pham-Kanter et al., Effect of Physician Payment Disclosure Laws on Prescribing, 172 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 819, 820 (2012) (finding that physicians were slightly more likely to decline finan-
cial relationships with the drug industry when state laws required disclosure); Sunita Sah & George 
Loewenstein, Nothing to Declare: Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure Leads Advisors to Avoid Conflicts of In-
terest, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 575, 583 (2014) (finding that disclosures can motivate advisors to avoid 
conflicts of interests). 
 166 See generally Anna C. Merrit et al., Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad, 4 SOC. & 
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY COMPASS 344 (2010) (describing the phenomenon under which “past 
moral behavior makes people more likely to do potentially immoral things without worrying about 
feeling or appearing immoral”). 
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incentive, and compare these to “actual” outcomes for each decision maker, 
with the incentive.  The difference is the causal effect of the incentive.   
1.  Design 
We used the same fact pattern as in the second experiment, but this time 
had respondents participate in either the role of witness or juror.  Table 2 
shows a schematic of five experimental conditions in two arms.   
The first arm had respondents in the role of the witness.  The primary 
dependent variable was again binary: whether the witness agreed or refused 
to give the false testimony that inculpates the defendants.  We did not ma-
nipulate the truth of the testimony, but instead focused on the worrisome 
cases of false testimony.  For simplicity in this experiment (since we were 
manipulating other things described below), we offered immunity as a single 
level of incentive (or not), and did not include subsequent offers or reminders 
to grind down the potential witness.  
In the first condition (W-I), the witness was in criminal jeopardy (a potential 
20 year sentence and loss of his life’s savings defending himself) but offered im-
munity that was conditioned on whether he gave favorable (but false) testimony 
inculpating the CEO and the Governor: “For your attorney to get you an im-
munity deal, you will have to testify favorably to the Government, to confirm 
the FBI’s theory of the case.”167  In the second condition (W-N), there was no 
such incentive: the witness was offered unconditional immunity regardless of 
whether the testimony would be favorable.168  Thus, in the second condition, 
the witness had no incentive to lie.  (Part IV below explores whether this situa-
tion could be created in the real world as a practicable reform.)   
In the second arm, the subjects served as jurors deciding the same case, 
and the primary dependent variable was whether they convicted the CEO 
and the Governor.  The vignette included legal definitions of the relevant 
crime, instructions about the presumption of innocence and the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard, eight stipulated facts, and additional contested facts. 
 
 167 “Your attorney says that in other cases, he has successfully arranged for important witnesses to get 
a deal for complete immunity.  Immunity would mean that you cannot be prosecuted for any crime 
related to your testimony.  For your attorney to get you an immunity deal, you will have to testify 
favorably to the Government, to confirm the FBI’s theory of the case.  Both the attorney and the 
FBI also emphasize the potentially severe criminal sanctions.” 
 168 “Fortunately, the FBI says that you are not their target.  So even before questioning you, they have 
made arrangements to grant you full immunity.  The order of immunity has already been finalized, 
and signed by a judge and the prosecutors.  They just want the truth; they do not want you to feel 
any pressure either way.  You hire an attorney who you know through your family.  The attorney 
reviews the documents and confirms that, regardless of what you saw and regardless of what you 
say, you face no criminal charges.”  
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There were three experimental conditions in the Juror Arm.  In the con-
trol condition, the witness did not appear at all; the Government simply 
asked the jury to convict on the remainder of the evidence.  In the second 
condition (J-I, corresponding to W-I), the witness testified and inculpated the 
defendants, but the jury was notified that he received a traditional immunity 
deal that was effectively conditioned on him giving testimony that favors the 
Government.169  In the third condition (J-N), the witness testified and incul-
pated the defendants, but had received an unconditional grant of immunity 
prior to even being interviewed by the FBI (as in W-N), thus ensuring that 
his testimony was not incentivized.170   
TABLE 2 
FIVE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS IN TWO ARMS 
 Witness Arm Juror Arm 
Incentive W-I J-I 
No Incentive W-N J-N 
No Witness N/A N-W 
2.  Results 
We recruited a diverse group of 351 respondents.171  Respondents spent 
approximately nine minutes completing the experiment.172  In the Witness 
arm, as shown in Figure 3, we found that 28% of respondents were willing 
to testify falsely, even when given unconditional immunity.  That rate nearly 
doubles to 51%, when prosecutors offer immunity conditionally on them 
providing favorable testimony (p < 0.01). 
 
 169 “On cross examination, you learn that the Aide was granted immunity from prosecution in ex-
change for her testimony . . . . The attorneys for the Defendants argue that this immunity deal 
created a huge incentive for the Aide to make up a false story.  If she had not promised to help the 
Government, then she likely would have been prosecuted too, facing a threat of jail time.  Thus, 
the attorneys suggest that her testimony is fabricated and you should ignore it.  The only real evi-
dence of guilt comes from this Aide, whose testimony was purchased by the Government.”  
 170 “On cross examination, you learn that the Aide was granted immunity from prosecution in ex-
change for her testimony . . . . You also learn that because the prosecutor wanted to prevent the 
Aide from having any reason to lie, the prosecutor granted immunity to the Aide before finding out 
what the Aide had to say.  Thus, the Aide had no incentive to testify by the threat of jail time.  The 
Aide was thus free to testify for either side, depending on what he saw and heard.” 
 171 We used Amazon Mechanical Turk, paying $1.25 each.  This group was 52% male.  In terms of 
ethnicity, 77% identified as White, 6% Black or African-American, 11% Asian, 1% American In-
dian or Alaskan Native, and 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander.  Separately, 8% identified as 
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino.  In terms of education, 15% had a high school degree or less, 75% 
had at least some college credit but not an advanced degree, and 10% had advanced degrees. 
 172 Average time to complete was 9:03.  
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In the Jury arm, shown in Figure 4, we find that only 25% of respondents 
vote to convict on the basic case, when no witness testifies.  An incentivized 
witness substantially raises the rate of convictions to 44% (p < 0.01).  If we 
assume, for a moment, that the witness is testifying truthfully, and would not 
do so without the incentive, then this comparison demonstrates the system-
atic value of prosecutorial incentives for reducing false negatives (exoneration 
of the guilty) in the criminal justice system.  On the other hand, if we assume 
that the witness is testifying falsely, then this comparison shows the risk of 
false convictions created by incentives.   
Comparing the conviction rates in the conditions in which the witness 
appears with conditional incentive (44%) versus an unconditional incentive 
(50%), we find them statistically indistinguishable.  Nonetheless, the trend is 
as one might hypothesize—jurors may give more weight to testimony whose 
substance is not bought by the prosecutors.     
In the jury condition with an incentivized witness, after rendering a ver-
dict (and unable to go back), respondents were asked: “Assume for a moment 
that a defendant is not guilty, but that a witness is given an immunity to testify 
for the government.  What percentage of the time do you think a witness in 
this situation would be willing to testify falsely to get immunity from prose-
cution himself?”  On average, jurors estimated that a witness would be will-
ing to testify falsely 40% of the time (SD: 25.16).   
FIGURE 3 
WITNESSES’ WILLINGNESS TO TESTIFY FALSELY BY PRESENCE OF 
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FIGURE 4 
JURORS’ WILLINGNESS TO CONVICT BY PRESENCE OF WITNESS  
AND WITNESS INCENTIVES, WITH 95% CONFIDENCE  















We acknowledge the same limitations of our study described for the first 
and second experiments.  This third experiment connects to a larger litera-
ture on jury behavior, which shows that the verdicts of both mock jurors and 
real jurors tend to track the strength of the evidence presented.173  A leading 
study suggests that neither “stimulus case realism” nor “study population” 
dampen the applicability of mock jury research to real-world scenarios.174   
One might be particularly concerned that our written vignette did not 
allow jurors to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses.  Perhaps the demeanor 
 
 173 See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 122–23 (2012) (re-
viewing this literature).  For a direct (but extremely limited) test of the validity question, see David 
L. Breau & Brian Brook, “Mock” Mock Juries: A Field Experiment on the Ecological Validity of Jury Simula-
tions, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 89–90 (2007) (finding that the results of disciplinary hearings 
in which jurors knew the proceedings were mock did not predict the results of the same disciplinary 
hearings in which jurors were misled into believing that the proceedings were genuine); see also 
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 
898 (1998) (reviewing various studies that involve both surveys of real jurors and mock jury exper-
iments, finding that juries do not decide cases any less competently than judges).   
 174 Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock, Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 511, 512 (2005) (citing Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the 
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of the incentivized lying witness would have cued the jury to disbelieve him?  
As the Supreme Court has said, “A fundamental premise of our criminal trial 
system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’”175  However, it is unlikely that a 
richer stimulus—even a video or a live actor attempting to reproduce the 
demeanor of a lying witness—would have actually helped jurors detect the 
lies more often.176  As Dan Simon explains the prior literature:  
To the extent that liars behave differently from truth tellers, they do so in 
ways that are diverse, idiosyncratic, and barely perceptible . . . . Numerous 
studies have found consistently that people’s judgments of deceit from de-
meanor are barely better than flipping a coin . . . . [ J ]udgments of deceit 
that are based on . . . audiovisual presentations . . . and transcripts of the 
testimony share similar levels of accuracy.177   
In fact, if we had provided a richer stimulus and the jurors then focused on 
the witness’s demeanor rather than focusing on his incentive to lie, overall 
accuracy may have been even worse. 
A related limitation of our study is that we did not allow jurors to delib-
erate together to reach collective verdicts, but rather we observed only indi-
vidual juror preferences.  The prior literature shows that the votes of individ-
ual jurors are predictive of collective jury outcomes, as the minority-voters 
going into deliberation are likely to be eventually persuaded by the majority 
voters.178  Thus individual juror responses are meaningful.   
Notwithstanding the limitations, these results are disconcerting.  In the 
Witness arm, the incentive had a very large effect on the substance of the 
witness’s testimony.  The 51% finding in Experiment Three is a near-repli-
cation of the 55% of witnesses willing to testify falsely when given conditional 
immunity in Experiment Two.  
It is worrisome (although not surprising) that individuals would behave in 
ways that are consistent with profound incentives.  The epistemic value of 
such testimony is quite poor, since the same testimony would probably be 
given, regardless of whether it is true.  Given the optimism and social desir-
ability biases described above, the true rate may be quite high. 
In the W-N conditions, we were surprised to find nearly one-fourth of 
 
 175 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)).   
 176 See ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE, 139–145 (2015) 
(reviewing the scientific literature on lie detection based on demeanor cues).   
 177 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, 166–68 (2012). 
 178 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Dam-
ages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 545–46 (1992) (“[T]he median [individual 
juror award pre-deliberation] is the best single predictor of the jury’s final verdict.”); see also Marla 
Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury 
Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 175 (1995) (“Interview data from respondents who had served 
on felony juries indicate that first ballots do predict jury verdicts at a high level.”). 
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respondents willing to testify falsely even in the condition where they had no 
incentive do so.  This may be an effect of individuals simply deferring to 
Government’s determination that the defendants were corrupt.  Indeed, 
prior research has found that merely when one side summons a bystander 
witness to testify, the testimony tends to be swayed in a favorable direction.179  
Some may have felt a sense of reciprocity for receiving the gift of immunity, 
even if it was not conditional on the giving of favorable testimony. 
Given that we observed a very large effect of incentives in the witness 
condition, we hoped to also see a very large effect of disclosed witness incen-
tives on the jury’s decision.  Such a finding would indicate that the current 
legal doctrine of mandatory disclosure (i.e., Brady) is working effectively, and 
that prosecutorial incentives may not be a primary cause of wrongful convic-
tions.  Unfortunately, we did not see that concordance.  Although we cannot 
rule out a modest-sized effect, we did not see any statistically significant effect 
of an incentives disclosure on the jury, even though the presence of incentives 
had a huge effect on the substance of the witness’s testimony.  Although the 
witness was willing to lie more than half the time, the presence of the unreli-
able witness nearly doubled the chance that a juror would convict.  This is a 
recipe for false convictions.   
How can such findings be explained?  One possibility is that jurors suc-
cumb to the fundamental attribution error (“FAE”).180  Human behavior is 
shaped by both character (including values such as honesty) as well as situa-
tions (including incentives), but the FAE is a tendency of people to underes-
timate the importance of situational factors when evaluating the behavior of 
others.181  In classic experiments, subjects were asked to evaluate an essay to 
determine whether the author was sincere in the beliefs described, while the 
researchers manipulated a cover story as to whether the author wrote the 
essay voluntarily or was ordered to do so.182  Respondents tended to believe 
the essayist’s behavior must correspond to an underlying true belief, dis-
counting the situational factors.  Our findings, that jurors are not sensitive to 
the presence of even profound incentives that likely affected the witness’s tes-
timony, are consistent with this phenomenon.183   
Jurors may have difficulty imagining what they would do if put in the 
shoes of the witness.  The incentives will be more salient to the witness than 
 
 179 Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses’ Communica-
tion of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 888, 895 
(1983); see also Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 185 (2010) 
(describing “affiliation bias” of expert witnesses, and compiling sources).   
 180 See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 23 (1967) (describing FAE). 
 181 Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 22 (1995). 
 182 Jones & Harris, supra note 180, at 4. 
 183 See generally DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT 152–53 (2012) (collecting sources for the proposition that, “peo-
ple are largely insensitive to the factors that make identifications more or less accurate.”). 
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the juror, making it unsurprising that a juror underestimates their effect.  Our 
finding that 51% of witnesses would testify falsely, compared with an estimate 
of 41% given by jurors, is consistent with this explanation.   
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
Our empirical studies add to our epistemic analysis and a body of prior 
research, all of which shows that incentivizing witnesses creates a severe risk 
of wrongful convictions, and disclosure fails to curb that risk.  In our three 
experiments, prosecutors appear able to procure favorable testimony, re-
gardless of whether it is true.  We are unaware of any evidence that the cur-
rent regime of disclosure allows jurors to reliably determine the truth on the 
basis of incentivized testimony. 
There is a range of potential solutions.  First, David Sklansky has argued, 
“It is bad enough to run the risk of perjury; it is even worse to run the risk 
only in favor of one side.”184  Accordingly one solution would be to permit 
defendants to give incentives to witnesses too.185  Yet, prosecution is a public 
function representing public values; criminal defendants would abuse the 
power to immunize fellow criminal defendants.  And judicial oversight of any 
such system would raise separations of powers problems, since the executive 
alone holds the power to prosecute.186 
Less radically, one could hope that with additional training, prosecutors 
become more discerning so as to only give incentives for true testimony.187  
At best this is a solution for the outlier cases; not a solution to the fundamental 
epistemological problem.  Human attorneys are fundamentally limited in 
their own abilities to discern the truth, even if they were not biased by their 
adversarial roles.   
Or, judges can become more aggressive in instructing jurors to be wary 
of such testimony, or allow them to hear framework testimony from experts 
to put the disclosure in context.188  Yet, an amplified disclosure strategy 
 
 184 Sklansky, supra note 20, at 525.  Similarly see, SIMON, supra note 183, 210 (2012) (“The process is 
deemed fair if the playing field is roughly level . . . .”).   
 185 H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Consideration for Helpful Testimony from Tainted Wit-
nesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 782–83, 792–93 (2002) (contending that defend-
ants should be entitled to the benefit of witness compensation, on the basis of the compulsory pro-
cess clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also 
C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 16 CAP. 
DEF. J. 1, 10 (2003) (discussing these proposals). 
 186 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority 
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”). 
 187 Cohen, supra note 13, at 825–27 (proposing that prosecutors get additional training).   
 188 See Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror 
Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1373–75 (2015) 
(proposing revised jury instructions); Harris, supra note 2, at 4–5 (proposing to “make that process 
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simply tells factfinders who they (maybe) should not believe.  It tells them that 
(maybe) they should distrust a given witness that may have ulterior motives.  
But it does not give them a clearer view of the truth.189   
We believe that two particular solutions demand further study: exclusion 
and blinding.  To assess these solutions, it is useful to draw on Dan Simon’s 
concept of criminal trials having “diagnosticity,” the accurate sorting of 
guilty from the non-guilty defendants, similar to how a medical test is sup-
posed to sort those that do have a given disease from those who do not.190  A 
criminal trial can instead fail, returning a false negative (exonerating a guilty 
person) or a false positive (convicting an innocent person).  The rate of true 
positives and true negatives, versus these false positives and false negatives, is 
the diagnosticity of criminal trials.     
A.  Exclusion 
One solution is to exclude incentivized testimony from trial.191  Such in-
centivized testimony is arguably more prejudicial than probative, and thus 
unhelpful to the factfinder.192  Our findings that prosecutors can often pro-
cure favorable testimony from rational witnesses, regardless of whether it is 
true, suggests that such incentivized testimony is not very reliable. 
 Importantly, this solution would not bar prosecutors from giving incen-
tives to informants.  For example a member of a criminal conspiracy could 
be given immunity to wear a recording device or to lead the investigators to 
physical evidence, which is then sufficient to convict the primary defendant.  
 
[of selecting, preparing, and compensating witnesses] more fully discoverable and, therefore, more 
accessible to assessment by triers of fact”); see also United States v. Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 105–06 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (affirming a trial court’s refusal to put on an “expert criminal defense attorney to explain 
the legal significance of [government requests for leniency for cooperating defendants]”); David 
Alan Sklanksy, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 456 (2013) (arguing 
that “[e]videntiary instructions probably do work, although imperfectly and better under some cir-
cumstances than others”).  But see Neuschatz et al., supra note 126, at 188 (finding framework expert 
had no effect on mock jury’s view of informant); see also Maeder & Pica, supra note 128, at 566 
(finding similar).   
 189 See Athan P. Papailiou et al., The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism but Not Sensi-
tivity, PLOS ONE, Dec. 9, 2015, at 8–9 (finding that New Jersey’s enhanced jury instruction for 
eyewitness testimony reduced reliance on both faulty and trustworthy eyewitness testimony); see also 
Robertson, supra note 131, at 696 (suggesting the necessity of an intervention that increases the 
amount of reliable evidence, rather than merely labeling more evidence more emphatically as un-
reliable). 
 190 Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 144, 146 (2011); see 
also SIMON, supra note 177, at 144 (describing the “diagnostic task” of “reach[ing] a factual determi-
nation whether the defendant did or did not commit the crime, that is, to distinguish between guilty 
and innocent defendants” as the criminal justice system’s “essential objective”). 
 191 Hollis, supra note 21, at 456 (arguing that contingent plea agreements should be disallowed). 
 192 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (establishing that courts may exclude relevant evidence when the evidence is 
substantially more prejudicial than probative). 
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Still, the proposed remedy of exclusion would prevent an incentivized witness 
from herself testifying as to the defendant’s guilt, based on her own ipse dixit.   
Some jurisdictions require that prosecutors corroborate some forms of 
incentivized testimony before offering it to jurors.193  Yet, the witnesses’ tes-
timony is offered for its marginal value on top of the corroborating evidence.  
Thus, the fact of corroboration does not explain how much marginal value 
it should be given.  Even worse, the corroboration may itself be tainted by 
the purchased testimony.194  
Doing without incentivized witnesses would likely reduce wrongful con-
victions.  Whether it increases the diagnosticity of trials overall depends on 
how much it reduces the power of prosecutors to secure true convictions, and 
thus achieve the deterrence and retribution functions of the law.  It is possible 
that the police will soon develop, or already have developed, alternative 
forms of evidence (e.g., wiretaps, video surveillance, GPS tracking, DNA test-
ing), which obviate the need for human witnesses in many cases.195  At some 
point, thus, the balance may tip and criminal trials become more diagnostic 
when incentivized witnesses are excluded.  These are empirical questions. 
If a complete ban on incentivized testimony is too radical, courts could 
instead attempt to screen the least reliable incentivized testimony, while per-
mitting other seemingly more reliable testimony.  This mechanism would be 
similar to the “Daubert” screening courts already use for expert witnesses, to 
ensure that it is reliable and helpful to the jury.196  Similarly, for every incen-
tivized witness the trial court could hold a hearing in limine to determine 
 
 193 See James C. Steffes, Immunity Given to the Accomplice Witness, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 332 (1972).   
 194 See William C. Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do Experts 
Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: 
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 133, 144–45 (Christo-
pher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016); Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity 
and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation, 51 SCI. & JUST. 204, 205 (2011) (giving an example of 
an adjudicated criminal case where an incentivized witness inculpated the defendant, and DNA 
scientists aware of this testimony then opined that the physical evidence could not exclude the de-
fendant; seventeen independent DNA scientists reviewed the same evidence without exposure to 
the purchased testimony, and only one agreed with the trial experts).   
 195 See ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE, 261 (2015) 
(“[T]echnologies already exist that can reduce our dependence on fallible human faculties . . . . With 
a proliferation of security cameras, an army of private citizens armed with smartphones, and more 
recording in interrogation rooms, squad cars, and prisons, the need to rely on the vagaries of human 
memory is greatly reduced.  And the less dependent we are on eyewitness identifications and testi-
mony, the less we have to place our trust in the ability of jurors to assess credibility . . . . Improved 
forensic analysis may also play an important role.”). 
 196 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993); see also Sandra Guerra Thomp-
son, Daubert Gatekeeping for Eyewitness Identifications, 65 SMU L. REV. 593, 594 (2012) (“[I]t is espe-
cially appropriate for courts in criminal trials to engage in gatekeeping for evidence fraught with 
reliability issues because it is highly prone to misleading the jury and causing a wrongful criminal 
conviction.”); Suedabeh Walker, Comment, Drawing on Daubert: Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in 
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 62 EMORY L.J. 1205, 1234 (2013) (proposing a 
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whether the testimony is more probative than prejudicial.   
The doctrinal test could require the trial judge to make a finding on the 
record that, even with the given type and amount of incentives actually paid 
for favorable testimony, the witness would be unlikely to give such testimony 
if it were false.  This counterfactual test is the appropriate epistemological 
question, because it is what makes the testimony reliable as an evidentiary 
signal of the truth.  If, instead, the incentive would be likely to cause rational 
witnesses to give favorable testimony regardless of whether it is true—likely 
quite often—then the testimony lacks probative value, and is thus more prej-
udicial.197  Of course, such counterfactual reasoning will be difficult and 
prone to speculation.  But ignoring that difficulty is no way to solve it.  
Admittedly, it is not clear that judges are any better at lie detection than are 
jurors.198  At the very least, however, this process would give defendants two 
chances to challenge an incentivized witness, first as to admissibility with the 
judge, then arguing the weight of the evidence with jurors.  As in the expert 
witness context, the judge has a gatekeeping obligation to ensure that unreliable 
evidence does not reach the jury at all.199  In this way, the gatekeeping function 
would rebalance the scales that currently unjustifiably favor the prosecution. 
B.  Blinding 
A second, novel solution is to retain leniency, immunity, and other incen-
tives, and retain the prosecutor’s unilateral power to grant those deals, but 
restructure the deals in a way that eliminates their propensity to create false 
testimony.  We piloted such a concept in the unconditional transactional im-
munity deal offered by the prosecution in one condition of Experiment Three 
above, where the prosecutor granted broad immunity to the potential witness 
before even learning whether the witness would testify favorably to the Gov-
ernment.  In this way, the prosecutor does not create an incentive that is 
conditional on that testimony favoring one side. 
Blinding is a mechanism that has been successfully used in many do-
mains, from biomedical science to the anonymous voting booth.200  Ben 
 
Daubert-like standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony). 
 197 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 198 See Robertson, supra note 179, at 196 (reviewing sources for the proposition that judges also have 
difficulty with scientific evidence). 
 199 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter 
how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and 
innovations.  That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for 
the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal dis-
putes.”). 
 200 See generally BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016). 
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Franklin conducted the first known blinded experiment in his own living 
room to disaggregate the theatrics of a medical charlatan from claimed heal-
ing powers.201  One of us (CTR) has elsewhere argued that the biases of ex-
pert witnesses could be ameliorated by the blinding of litigants (in the selec-
tion of experts) and experts (in rendering opinions on cases), to help jurors 
get a clearer view of the truth.202  Similarly, here in the context of eyewitness 
testimony, it is useful to disaggregate materiality from favorability—two dis-
tinct functions currently performed by prosecutorial incentives.   
First, prosecutors’ deals provide information to the prosecutors and to the 
factfinder, by overcoming whatever resistance a witness may have to provid-
ing substantive testimony.  It can be onerous to be a witness in a criminal 
case.  An incentive allows the prosecutor to overcome feigned ignorance or 
lack of memory; the witness must bindingly show that she will testify substan-
tively before getting the benefits of that deal.  These stated intentions are 
reliable for the prosecutor because they can be locked down as sworn state-
ments and/or statements to an official, which then give rise to various theo-
ries of criminal jeopardy if a witness later offers contrary testimony.203  In this 
way, incentives procure material information. 
Second, incentives also tend to cause witnesses to signal that they will give 
testimony that is favorable to prosecutors, since prosecutors have the legal 
monopoly on giving such incentives.  A witness who would give unfavorable 
testimony is much less likely to receive the incentive.  This second function is 
the worrisome one, which has the prospect of causing the witness to provide 
false testimony, when the truth happens to be unfavorable to the prosecution, 
even if the prosecution does not know that is the case. 
Can these two functions be disaggregated so that incentives produce ma-
terial information for trial, without producing an incentive to lie?  Could 
prosecutors irrevocably decide whether to grant the benefit without knowing 
whether the witness’s testimony is likely to be favorable?   
In deciding whether to offer an incentive, a prosecutor must be able to 
determine whether the testimony will be relevant and material (e.g., whether 
the witness was present at the scene, whether he saw who committed the 
crime).  However, the prosecutor arguably does not need to know whether 
the relevant, material testimony will be favorable towards a verdict of guilt 
 
 201 Id. at 25–26, 46–47. 
 202 See Robertson, supra note 179, at 179 (developing the concept and showing how it could be imple-
mented in civil settings in particular); Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of 
Blinded Experts on Juror Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 770 (2012) (testing the efficacy of 
using blind experts as a trial strategy).   
 203 See discussion surrounding supra notes 86–88. 
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or innocence.  Either sort of testimony would serve justice, and the prosecu-
tor is an officer of the court with a special duty beyond that of an advocate.204   
Importantly, the federal law that formalizes immunity deals already re-
quires the decision to be made from a senior Department of Justice official, 
rather than by line prosecutors.205  The material given to this official could 
thus be manipulated so he or she decides whether to offer the incentive with 
knowledge of the materiality of the testimony, but without knowing its favor-
ability to the Government.   
There are precedents for these sorts of interventions, where one set of 
lawyers knows information that is withheld from others, even on the same 
side of the case.  For example, different prosecutors are assigned to “taint 
teams” to review material that is potentially attorney-client protected.206  The 
Department of Justice also uses a blinding procedure to ensure that ultimate 
decisions about whether to pursue the death penalty are not biased by 
knowledge about the race of the defendant.207   
This proposal would blind senior decision makers, but not the line pros-
ecutors who submit proposed incentives to them.  Of course, line-prosecutors 
will selectively submit applications to the senior officials, only recommending 
incentives when the testimony is likely to be favorable, and witnesses will thus 
have an incentive to shape their testimony accordingly.  One solution would 
be to lock down testimony that the witness will testify substantively (perhaps 
in a carefully-written sworn affidavit), but allow cheap talk about the content 
of the testimony at this preliminary stage.  Defense attorneys could facilitate 
 
 204 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); Russell M. Gold, Beyond 
the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1635 (2014) (reiter-
ating the special ethical duties of prosecutors); accord United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 
(1976) (stating that prosecutors should ensure that “justice shall be done”); Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one.”);  NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009) (“The 
prosecutor is an independent administrator of justice.  The primary responsibility of a prosecutor 
is to seek justice . . . .”); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEF. FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, 
not merely to convict.”). 
 205 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (2012) (“A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or any designated Assistant 
Attorney General or Deputy Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of 
this section . . . .”). 
 206 United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234–35, 238 (D. Me. 2011) (holding suppression of 
e-mails and related information was not warranted because a filter agent, or taint team member, 
removed all privileged e-mails). 
 207 Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the 
Criminal Justice System, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y, Dec. 2015, at 70–71 (finding that race plays a signifi-
cant role in a convicted felon’s sentencing, and that the Justice Department therefore has reiterated 
its commitment to blind sentencing). 
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this sort of agreement by preventing the witness from speaking on the record 
in a way that binds his substantive testimony.  Alternatively, the agreement 
to testify substantively would include the Government waiving any prosecu-
tion for inconsistent prior statements (though they could be used as impeach-
ment on cross-examination).  This sort of waiver is routine in deals with pros-
ecutors—recall that the primary function of incentives, even under the status 
quo, is to change the testimony that the witness has otherwise signaled that 
she would give if not incentivized.208 
Let us set aside the practicalities of how blinding would be implemented.  
Regardless of those details, one should worry that defendants will use such 
deals opportunistically.  There are two forms of such opportunism.   
First, the potential witness could claim that he has material, relevant in-
formation and secure an incentive, but then either refuse to actually testify at 
trial or testify to the contrary, saying that he does not in fact have material, 
relevant information.  This first form of opportunistic behavior can be po-
liced in the same way that incentive deals are currently policed—the benefit 
can be withheld conditional on there being substantive testimony.   
Second, concededly, the blinding of incentives does not eliminate the in-
centive for witnesses to feign that they have material information, since only 
those claiming to have material information will receive an incentive to tes-
tify.  Such incentivized testimony will thus produce some information for the 
jury that is untrue, by witnesses who would have otherwise simply remained 
silent or forgetful (if given no incentive) or testified for the Government (if 
given a conditional incentive).  With blinded incentives, such false testimony 
will be noise—not systematically biased towards conviction of the innocent, 
as with conditional incentives.  That would seem to be progress.   
CONCLUSION 
It is an odd and disturbing system of criminal justice that, without hyper-
bole, depends on legalized bribery.209  Given that prosecutors have other 
tools that can be used to compel a witness to testify, our analysis has shown 
that the causal effect of incentives is to change what the witness actually says 
on the stand, converting it to something that the prosecutor prefers.210   
Empirically, witnesses appear willing to testify favorably to the Govern-
ment when incentivized to do so, regardless of the truth.  Juries fail to suffi-
ciently discount for this risk of false testimony. 
 
 208 See supra the Introduction. 
 209 See supra the Introduction (showing that courts have held that the giving of condition incentives to 
witnesses would be bribery, except that prosecutors are not persons for the purpose of the federal 
bribery statute).   
 210 See supra Part II (reviewing other tools available to prosecutors). 
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There are several potential reforms, which can work together to reduce 
the risk of wrongful convictions, while maintaining prosecutors’ ability to se-
cure correct convictions.  For example, if blinded (unconditional) incentives 
are proven to be feasible, that may strengthen arguments for excluding testi-
mony bought in contingent deals.   
Such reforms will change the relative power of prosecutors and defend-
ants to produce favorable outcomes.  If criminal trials presently include a 
systematic bias in favor of prosecutors, such reforms may increase diagnos-
ticity overall.211  Blinding or exclusion may remove one thumb that is now 
on the scale of criminal justice. 
There are a number of grave constitutional questions raised by the cur-
rent system of incentivized testimony.  First, the high potential for perjured 
testimony we saw in the presence of incentives suggests that a defendant’s 
due process rights may be threatened.  It is difficult to obtain a fair trial in 
the face of perjury, and this is more troublesome given that the perjury is in 
some cases caused by the actions of the prosecutor.  Second, the inability of 
jurors to properly discount incentivized testimony suggests the current incen-
tive regime prevents defendants from obtaining a full and fair jury trial, or 
an effective cross examination.  When these constitutional issues are consid-
ered in light of the significant number of false convictions related to incentiv-
ized disclosure, it serves as a significant condemnation of the current regime.   
 
 
 211 See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Victims, Survivors, 
and Witnesses in the Era of Victims’ Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103 (2003) (noting that 
defense attorneys are sometimes unable to even talk to witnesses).  See generally Alex Kozinski, Pref-
ace, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2015) (surveying a range of system-
atic factors benefitting the prosecution). 
